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ABSTRACT 
 
A NUCLEAR JIHAD: 
THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON NON-STATE VIOLENCE IN THE  
INDIA-PAKISTAN CONFLICT. (May 2012) 
 
 
J. Ryne Danielson, B.S., Appalachian State University 
 
M.A., Appalachian State University 
 
Chairperson:  George Ehrhardt 
 
 Nuclear weapons have been studied extensively in the literature, but seldom with 
a focus on their effects vis a vis non-state actors and levels of non-state violence.  This 
paper proposes a systematic way to study just this, using the comparative method and a 
most-similar research design to uncover the role nuclear weapons have played in the 
India-Pakistan conflict.  This study divides the conflict into three separate cases for cross-
comparison:  1948-74, 1975-85, and 1986-2007.  When rates of non-state violence are 
compared across the cases it becomes clear that nuclear weapons have precipitated a 
drastic rise in levels of non-state violence. 
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Introduction 
 
Nuclear weapons have been of enormous interest to international relations 
scholars since they were first used in anger in August of 1945.  And yet, for all the 
attention they have received, their precise effect on international politics has been 
(and continues to be) hard to measure.   
The history of nuclear weapons is deeply intertwined with the history of the 
Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.  But the Cold War is over 
and the Soviet Union no longer exists; nuclear weapons do.  As the world has changed 
in the post-Cold War era, so too have perceptions of nuclear weapons and their effects 
on the international system.  The world has shifted from the massive bi-polar alliances 
of 1945-1991 to the current uni-polar moment of U.S. domination.  However, another, 
perhaps equally dramatic, shift is underway.  At the economic level the world is 
already multi-polar; military power may lag behind economic power, but the two 
cannot long be separated.1   
During the Cold War, most literature on nuclear weapons focused on the 
concept of deterrence.  After the Cold War, proliferation became the key issue.  And 
more recently, the specter of nuclear terrorism has been pervasive within both 
academic and policy circles.  But, running throughout the research is a key question:  
do nuclear weapons generally contribute to the peace and stability of those states 
which posses them, or do the risks of miscalculation, proliferation, terrorism, and 
outright accidents outweigh their benefits?   
                                                          
1 Joseph S. Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It 
Alone, (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002). 
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I propose an additional consideration:  non-state violence.  Will nuclear 
weapons lead to a rise in non-state violence in those states which possess them?  I 
believe that they will. The central argument of this paper is a continuation of the 
stability-instability paradox of nuclear weapons introduced by B.H. Liddell Hart in 
1960.2  The paradox is that nuclear weapons both constrain a state’s ability to wage 
existential war against another state, but at the same time permit that state to engage 
in lower intensity conflicts without fear of escalation to the level of existential crisis.  
I apply this logic to the sub-state level to build an argument that the rise of non-state 
violence in India and Pakistan beginning in the late 1980s was one result of the 
nuclearization of the sub-continent that began in 1974 and came to fruition with the 
dramatic 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 B.H. Liddell Hart, Deterrent or Defense: A Fresh Look at the West’s Military Position, (New York:  
Frederick A. Praeger, 1960). 
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Literature Review 
 
Before continuing, it may be helpful to explore the existing literature on the 
topic of nuclear weapons and to discuss some key concepts necessary for the 
understanding of their role in international politics. 
Deterrence  
States in the international system exist in a condition of anarchy.  This is the 
central tenant of realism and it has a certain benefit:  it’s true.   What anarchy means 
to states is not as clear, however, as whether it exists in the first place.  To a realist, it 
means self-help.  And the primary way a state must help itself is by acting to ensure 
its own security.  One way to do this is through fortifications.  Another is through 
deterrence.  Unlike fortifications, deterrence does not rely on preventing an attack, but 
in punishing one after the fact.  Nuclear weapons seem uniquely suited to this role. 
Winston Churchill famously called peace “the sturdy child of terror.”3  
Nuclear weapons have so changed the calculus of interstate conflict as to make full-
scale war between nuclear states inherently irrational.  In reality, nuclear deterrence 
doesn’t just happen; nuclear weapons do not create a “balance of terror” in and of 
themselves.  Rather, this terror is constructed, and, in turn, balanced, in an active and 
participatory way.  Nuclear deterrence is, in effect, an agreement by both sides to be 
deterred.   
                                                          
3 Quoted in John Mueller, "The Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons," International Security 13, no. 2 (Fall 
1988): 56. 
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The balance implicit in a mutual deterrence framework is more precarious 
than it might initially seem.4  Each side must build up not only the capability to attack 
the other first, but the capability to attack the other second.  That is, each side must be 
able to retaliate even as the nuclear missiles are falling.  This entails dispersed 
weapons systems with autonomous chains of command.   
There is a paradox here:  the more survivable a state’s nuclear weapons (i.e., 
the more credible its deterrence), the more those weapons are prone to being used in 
error.  This can be seen in great detail during the Cuban Missile Crisis; even as 
Kennedy and Khrushchev were working hard to defuse the situation, the forces of 
each side were following standing orders which brought the world closer and closer to 
nuclear war.5  There is another paradox at play as well, this one more comforting:  
deterrence is facilitated by communication and the sharing of sensitive information 
with one’s enemy.     
The Cold War is over and we are still here.  So, by one estimation, deterrence 
worked.  Or, at the very least, it didn’t fail.  The period since 1945 has been the most 
peaceful in modern history, if one defines peace as an absence of general conflict 
between the world’s great powers.6  In the last six decades, wars have been smaller 
and more contained, none approaching the scale and horror of the Second World War.   
However, to attribute this peace to nuclear weapons alone is difficult.  John 
Mueller lists several intervening variables that also contributed to the absence of war 
since 1945.  First, the memory of the horror and devastation of the Second World 
War, which resulted in the deaths of 50 million people worldwide, was fresh in the 
                                                          
4 Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," Foreign Affairs 37, no. 2 (January 1959): 211-
34. 
5 Graham T.Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis 
(New York: Longman, 2010). 
6 D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: a Debate Renewed (New York:  
W. W. Norton, 2003). 
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minds of post-war leaders.  Conventional war had become sufficiently destructive and 
costly to factor heavily into any state’s calculus when considering war.  Second, after 
the Second World War, the only nations left capable of starting another war were the 
victors.  And the allied powers were sufficiently content with the post-war order as to 
make war unlikely.   
Certainly, the outcome of the Cold War was over-determined.  But, it’s 
impossible to test a counter-factual.  Whether or not a third world war would have 
occurred without the invention of nuclear weapons may be essentially irrelevant.  
Whether or not there were other factors involved, and there most certainly were, 
nuclear weapons have gotten the credit.  “While nuclear weapons may have 
substantially influenced political rhetoric, public discourse, and defense budgets and 
planning,” Mueller says, “it is not at all clear that they had a significant impact on the 
history of world affairs...”7  This seems to be Mueller’s main mistake; he argues that 
nuclear weapons have no “magical” properties, all the while ignoring their very real 
political effects.   
The constructed meaning of nuclear weapons is just as important as their raw 
power.  Indeed, deterrence would be impossible without such a political conception of 
these weapons.  Nuclear war is not impossible, but norms have evolved to make it 
unthinkable.  The atomic bombs used against Hiroshima were not qualitatively 
different from other weapons used in World War II.  While they made it possible to 
cause much more damage in a much shorter time than conventional weapons, the fire-
bombing of Tokyo caused far more damage overall.  This is, in fact, one key reason 
the United States did not target Tokyo with one of the bombs; it was already mostly 
destroyed.   
                                                          
7 Op. cit., Mueller 1988, 56.. 
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Why, then, weren’t these weapons used again in the Korean War, years before 
the Soviet Union and decades before China had a credible nuclear deterrent?  A 
rationalist would argue that norms are based in self-interest.  However, a 
constructivist would argue precisely the opposite, that self-interest is based on norms.  
In this case, the constructivist seems more convincing.   
President Truman, seeing the horror of the first two atomic bombs, was 
reluctant to consider using another, even should Japan not surrender.  Truman also set 
an important precedent, the civilian control of nuclear weapons.  Nuclear weapons 
were now treated as  qualitatively different from other weapons at the military's 
disposal.8 
 By the time of the Korean War, nuclear weapons came to be defined by their 
disproportionate lethality and their indiscriminate nature, the fact that they kill 
civilians and combatants alike.  Quickly, these weapons became antithetical to the 
moral nation its citizens understood the United States to be.  Internationally, nuclear 
weapons were held as “uncivilized” weapons, antithetical to the ideals of any modern 
nation.9  The United States and the Soviet Union quickly constructed a shared 
identity, that of civil enemies, without which deterrence would not have been 
possible.  This identity was institutionalized through international law, arms-control 
agreements, and the like.10  War is in many ways a social institution. 
 Until now, we have discussed what deterrence is and how it functions, 
especially vis a vis nuclear weapons.  But, to gain a better understanding of how 
nuclear weapons have prevented general conflict, if indeed they have, it is necessary 
to understand why nations go to war to begin with.   
                                                          
8 Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-use of Nuclear Weapons since 
1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007).  
9 Ibid. 
10 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1998).  
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 To realists, the answer is anarchy.11  There is no external power to prevent 
war, so war is inevitable.  States view security as a zero-sum game; as one state builds 
its military power, ostensibly to make itself more secure, it makes the states around it 
less secure.12  In turn, those states build their own military power, leading to an arms 
race.  This is the classic security dilemma.  It is in the interest of any state to make its 
neighbors less secure--war is one means of doing just this.  A state’s primary interest 
is survival.  If a state believes war will ensure its survival, even if the costs are great, 
then that state will pursue war.  War is primarily a result of fear and uncertainty.13 
 However, nuclear weapons change this calculus.  Nuclear weapons make full-
scale war unsurvivable.  A state may fight, even if it does not think it can win, if the 
alternative of not fighting is even worse.  However, there is no worse-case scenario 
than fighting a full-scale nuclear war; indeed, winning a such a war becomes 
irrelevant.  Once nuclear weapons are involved, fear remains, but uncertainty does 
not.   
 The distribution of power in the international system is key to realists.  
Waltz’s theory of international relations is a systems-level theory linking stability to 
power and the distribution of power across a system.14  Bi-polar systems are 
inherently more stable than multi-polar systems.  In multi-polar systems, 
miscalculation is more likely.  There are simply more players to keep track of, and so 
states are more prone to shooting first, as it were.  During the Cold War, power was 
distributed across two massive alliance systems, resulting in a relatively stable bi-
polar system.  Nuclear weapons were largely, but not entirely, contained within this 
                                                          
11 Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2008). 
12 John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," World Politics 2, no. 2 (January 
1950): 157-80. 
13 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 
1976). 
14 Op. cit., Waltz 2008. 
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system.  In terms of nuclear power, the world is now multi-polar, and as more and 
more states gain access to nuclear weapons, miscalculation becomes increasingly 
likely.   
 Continuing in the realist vein, war is also more likely during power transitions.  
“Order [in the international system] arises from the ability of a dominant power to 
impose its preferences on other actors.”15  Over time, order becomes institutionalized 
and states learn what to expect from one another, which contributes to peace and 
stability.16  However, it makes sense that less powerful states would not be content 
with the status quo.  These states will wish to overturn the current status quo, while 
dominant powers will wish to preserve it.  When rising powers approach parity with 
dominant ones, either through their rise alone or together with a decline by the 
dominant power, then conflict is likely.17  This dynamic can be seen in the 
Napoleonic, Franco-Prussian, and Russo-Japanese Wars, as well as in the First and 
Second World Wars.   
 During the Cold War the status quo was remarkably stable, thanks in part to 
the absolute domination of nuclear power by the two super powers and their close 
allies.  The first challenge to the exclusivity of the nuclear club came in 1960 when 
France detonated its first atomic weapon.  Doubting the credibility of the United 
States’ extended deterrence, whether the United States would initiate full-scale 
nuclear war to prevent a Soviet incursion into western Europe (with good reason, for a 
realist perspective), France wished to have its own nuclear deterrent.  However, 
                                                          
15 Richard Ned Lebow, Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives for War (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge UP, 2010),  33. 
16 Kenneth A.Oye "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies," World 
Politics 38, no. 1 (1985): 1-24.  
17 Abramo F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago, 1991),  19-
20. 
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France remained a part of NATO, albeit without remaining under its united military 
command, and France’s nuclear weapons did not greatly shake the bi-polar status quo.   
 The next test came in 1964 when China detonated its first atomic weapon.  
Ostensibly an ally of the Soviet Union, the actual relationship was much more 
complicated.  The Sino-Soviet split began in the early 1960s as an ideological dispute 
between each state’s respective communist party.  However, by 1969, the dispute had 
risen to the level of the nation state, resulting in a limited border conflict.  There is 
some evidence that the Soviet Union considered a nuclear first-strike against China’s 
nuclear sites, but was discouraged by American balancing.18  It is interesting to note 
that soon after this confrontation the United States took steps to normalize relations 
with the PRC.  This is a stark example of how power transitions and multi-polarity 
can be exceedingly dangerous, especially when nuclear weapons are involved. 
 It seems clear that the effects of nuclear weapons on the international system 
are real and complex.  The speed and totality of devastation inherent in nuclear war 
have caused nuclear powers to be much more cautious in their relations with other 
nuclear powers.  The costs of escalation are enormous and the room to negotiate a 
victory in the midst of a crisis is extremely limited.19  Modernization, of which 
nuclear weapons are one aspect, has “not only increased the costs of war, but...created 
alternative paths to established goals...”20  In a stable, bi-polar system, nuclear 
weapons force states to communicate and compromise; they make mutual security 
frameworks more feasible.  Their effects at the regional, national, and sub-national 
level are less clear.   
                                                          
18 Andrew Osborn and Peter Foster, "USSR Planned Nuclear Attack on China in 1969," The Telegraph 
[London] 13 May 2010. 
19 Robert Jervis, "The Utility of Nuclear Deterrence," International Security 13, no. 2 (Fall 1988): 80-
90. 
20 Ibid., 88 
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Proliferation, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Terrorism 
 
There are conflicting opinions on whether more nuclear weapons states will be 
better or worse for the general stability of the international system.  Nuclear weapons 
have changed the nature of military force; they have proscribed some uses of force, 
while making others more relevant.  For example, full-scale military engagements 
between nuclear armed countries are unlikely for fear of escalation to the nuclear 
level, which eliminates the need for many traditional military assets.  But low-
intensity guerrilla conflicts and the technology and skills to wage them are 
increasingly in demand.  In limiting the relevance of some uses of force, and in 
fostering military relations between enemies and military and economic 
interdependence between allies, nuclear weapons have been instrumental.  In addition, 
many key aspects of modernity stem from the nuclear stalemate of the Cold War.  The 
internet, for example, was intended as a means of maintaining communications in the 
aftermath of nuclear war.  The very dispersed, decentralized infrastructure that 
facilitated survivability also facilitated an information revolution when co-opted by 
the civilian world.  Globalization is, in many ways, a nuclear phenomenon.   
It is no wonder, then, that as power becomes more diffuse across multiple 
dimensions, more and more states will seek to attain nuclear weapons as a shortcut to 
relevance, influence, and security on the international stage.  Reflexively, complex 
interdependence makes this easier as multiple channels of communication and 
powerful non-state organizations foster the proliferation of nuclear technology 
without respect to national interests or traditional state borders.21   
Before addressing whether or not proliferation will make the world more or 
less stable, it will pay to examine in depth the consequences of proliferation vis a vis 
                                                          
21 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Longman, 2012).  
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the states that proliferate.  First, while nuclear weapons do not, in and of themselves, a 
great power make, they do greatly increase a state’s options on the world stage.  Force 
is a fungible asset.22  It can be used to intimidate and to coerce, and can free a state 
from the intimidation and coercion of others.  Nuclear power is especially fungible; it 
is equal to prestige and influence, is the ultimate instrument of threat and blackmail, 
and makes one virtually immune from the threats other states (providing a credible 
deterrent is constructed).  Force alone is rarely sufficient to achieve one’s goals, but 
without the credible threat of force, achieving those goals is next to impossible.  Force 
in an integral part of statecraft.23 
Robert Art lists four primary functions of force.24  1) Defense:  the traditional 
military use of force.  2) Deterrence:  the threat of retaliation; discussed at length 
above.  3) Compellence:  the threat of force applied to coerce; which will be discussed 
at length below.  4) Swagger:  the display of military capability to gain prestige.   
Nuclear weapons are less suited to traditional defense (indeed, they make 
many aspects of traditional defense redundant, if not irrelevant); nuclear weapons are, 
however, well suited to deterrence, compellence, and swaggering.  Of the four, 
swaggering is the least studied and the least remarked upon in the literature.  
Swaggering is indirect; it may enhance the power of both deterrence and compellence, 
but this is not its primary purpose.  It is often linked to nationalism and can be used to 
foment a coherent national identity, especially in the face of oppositional factors such 
as ethnic or religious cleavages.  “The Swaggering function of military power is...at 
one and the same time the most comprehensive and the most diffuse, the most 
versatile in its effects and the least focused in its immediate aims, the most 
                                                          
22 Robert J. Art "American Foreign Policy and the Fungibility of Force," Security Studies 5, no. 4 
(Summer 1996): 7-42. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Robert J. Art "To What Ends Military Power," International Security 4 (Spring 1980): 4-35. 
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instrumental in the long run and the least instrumental in the short run, easy to justify 
on hardheaded grounds and often undertaken on emotional grounds.”25  The audience 
for Swaggering can be either foreign or domestic; indeed, it is usually both.  We will 
return to swaggering shortly as it pertains specifically to the cases.   
Compellence and deterrence are rooted in the diplomacy of violence.  “There 
is a difference in taking what you want and making someone give it to you, between 
fending off assault and making someone afraid to assault you, between holding what 
people are trying to take and making them afraid to take it...”26  To compel another 
state to act, or not to act, it is necessary to exploit that state’s fears and desires.  The 
diplomacy of violence is based on the power to inflict hurt, unacceptable damage, 
upon another state; nuclear weapons are especially suited to this role.  In addition, 
they are highly psychological weapons, precisely because there are norms against 
their use.27  Compellence can be highly asymmetrical, especially where nuclear 
weapons are involved.  “Opposing strengths may cancel each other, pain and grief do 
not.”28  It does not matter how much stronger a state is, if another state can credibly 
threaten to inflict unreasonable hurt, it gain leverage even over a more powerful state.  
Nuclear weapons only exacerbate this; nuclear weapons make it possible to inflict 
terrible damage to one’s enemy without first achieving victory.  Further, it only takes 
one nuclear weapon to inflict unreasonable damage, especially on states that are 
highly accountable to their citizens.  A single nuclear weapon may not pose an 
existential threat to a state itself, but if that state is a democracy, it certainly poses an 
existential threat to that state’s government.  For obvious reasons, less powerful states 
might greatly desire nuclear weapons, as they give these states leverage over much 
                                                          
25 Ibid., 15 
26 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence  (London: Yale UP, 1971). 
27 Op. cit., Tannenwald 2007. 
28 Ibid., 2 
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more powerful states.  Further, a nuclear weapons program is often considerably 
cheaper than investing in conventional military capabilities.  Nuclear weapons matter 
much more to weak states than to strong ones.   
Nuclear weapons change the diplomacy of violence in several key ways.  First, 
“war is a continuation of politics by other means.”29  The diplomacy of violence can 
often devolve into war with little notice.  But, while conventional war is a bargaining 
process, nuclear war is not and cannot be.30  Nuclear war results in such destruction at 
such a fantastic speed that bargaining is all but impossible.  The diplomacy of 
violence works best when actual violence is withheld; to use nuclear weapons 
coercively, and not suicidally, violence must be withheld.   
How, then, can a state engage in blackmail with a weapon that all parties know 
must never be used?  It is advantageous for a state to feign irrationality in order to 
convince other states that it will, indeed, follow through with its threats.  North Korea 
is a prime example.  Call this the diplomacy of crazy.  Alternatively, a state may hint 
that, if provoked, nuclear weapons could fall into the wrong hands, either 
intentionally or through a crisis of state.  Pakistan would seem to be a good example 
of this.   
As more states gain nuclear weapons capability, the contours of international 
politics and security become harder to map.  The modern international system, since 
the fall of the Soviet Union, has been defined by a single, inclusive security 
community.  Two major powers, Russia and China, exist at the periphery of this 
system, but in many ways these states are oddities when compared with the highly 
developed democracies of North America, Western Europe, and East Asia.31  War 
                                                          
29 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (Harmondsworth, England.: Penguin, 1982). 
30 Op. cit., Schelling 1971. 
31 Robert Jervis, "War in an Era of Leading Power Peace," American Political Science Review 96, no. 1 
(March 2002):23-46. 
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between the United States and Japan, say, or France and Britain, both of which 
conflicts have occurred in the past, are all but unimaginable today.  What’s more, it 
doesn’t make sense to say that Japan is deterred from attacking the United States, or 
that Britain is deterred from attacking France.  This would imply that such an attack is 
first considered and then rejected via cost-benefit analysis.  This is not the case.  
There seems to be something special about highly developed democracies that prevent 
war between them, even among nations that are natural rivals.32 
It makes sense, then, that these countries would wish to keep nuclear 
technology between themselves.  As mentioned, Russia and China pose the first 
challenges to this.  Both are still developing economically, technologically, and 
politically.  The Soviet Union was a superpower; Russia, despite its nuclear arsenal, is 
not.  Indeed, Russia may have more in common with some other former Soviet 
republics, several of which also retained a residual nuclear capability, than it does 
with the former Soviet Union.33 
But, Russia and China are known quantities.  The Western security 
community has a long history of engaging with them.  North Korea and Pakistan and 
to some degree India and Israel are more troublesome.34  First, there is a real fear that 
any of these countries, if threatened, might use nuclear weapons offensively.  In 
addition, nuclear weapons give these states the power to threaten much stronger 
states; they give these states the ability to engage in offensive diplomacy.35  Second, 
proliferation greatly increases the possibility of an accident, especially when less-
                                                          
32 Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, 
no. 4 (Summer 1983): 323-53; and Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic 
Community:  The Case of NATO,” in The Culture of National Security (Columbia:  Columbia UP, 
1996). 
33 Op. cit., Jervis 2002. 
34 Kenneth N. Waltz, "Peace, Stability, and Nuclear Weapons," in International Politics: Enduring 
Concepts and Contemporary Issues (New York: Longman, 2003), 448-62.  
35 Ibid. 
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developed states get highly advanced weaponry before developing the technological 
capability to handle such weapons safely.36  Third, there is the possibility that an 
authoritarian state, such as Iran or Syria, or until recently Libya, would be very hard 
to deter.  Authoritarian states are unaccountable to their citizens and have shown a 
willingness to use violence against their own citizens.  A regime is much easier to 
fortify than an entire country; this changes the calculus of deterrence greatly.37  
Fourth, nuclear weapons greatly increase the difficulty of Western intervention.  Had 
Libya not given up its nuclear weapons program, for example, NATO’s air campaign 
against the Qaddafi regime would have been almost impossible.38  And finally, the 
specter of nuclear terrorism haunts any “rogue” nuclear state. 
When non-state actors engage in the diplomacy of violence it is called 
terrorism.  Terrorism is not an inherently modern phenomenon, but the global 
information revolution has made the work of terrorists much easier.  After all, the 
target of a terrorist and the victims of a terrorist attack are not one and the same.  The 
target of terrorism is the general public.  A terrorist attack is always an implicit threat:  
meet our demands or more attacks will follow.  Terror is the message, violence is the 
medium.  And “because of their incredible killing power and malevolent mystique, 
weapons of mass destruction have an unrivaled capacity to terrorize a society.”39 
The state, for now, is alive and well, and as an institution continues to shape 
international politics.40  However, state sovereignty is significantly different today 
than it was even a hundred years ago.  State control over religion, currency, and 
                                                          
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, "The Non-State NBC Threat," in 
America's Achilles' Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT, 2001), 206-15. 
40 Stephen D. Krasner "State Sovereignty Is Alive and Well," Foreign Policy (January/February 2001): 
20-31. 
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citizenship has been greatly diminished by normative, institutional, and technological 
changes that have taken place in the last century.41  Joseph Nye has argued that the 
present nature of the international system amounts to “cyber-feudalism” which is 
characterized by multiple and complex channels of communication, information 
communities, a decentralization of power, and competing loyalties.  Contrary to 
expectations, these competing loyalties are often even more pronounced in less 
developed countries.  In Pakistan, for example, one is expected to be loyal to one’s 
tribe, one’s ethnic group, one’s religion, and one’s state.42  Technology does not 
foster unity, it exacerbates division.   
The state’s power is diminished for several key reasons.  As previously 
discussed, nuclear weapons make war too costly, making traditional power more and 
more irrelevant.  Economic interdependence does much the same thing.  Nationalism 
also keeps foreign adventurism in check; it is hard to conquer an awakened 
population.  And democratization makes war increasingly hard to justify as citizens 
hold their governments accountable.43 
But politics, like nature, abhors a vacuum, and as a state’s power wanes, non-
state actors see their powers increase.  In recent years, transnational activist networks 
have proven quite successful in shaping the flow of information around the globe, in 
engaging in information and leverage politics, and in practicing lawfare to achieve 
specific goals.  Transnational activist networks (TANs) emerge when a state’s citizens 
cannot resolve an issue domestically (when the state is either unable or unwilling to 
meet the demands of domestic activist groups) and when such domestic activist 
groups have the means and opportunity to network internationally.  The global 
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information revolution has greatly increased both means and opportunity.  When 
successful, TANs can shape or re-shape the dominant political discourse, can set new 
agendas, bring about institutional change, and alter a state’s behavior.44 
It’s a small step from transnational activist networks to transnational terrorist 
groups; the difference is simply the willingness to take another step, to engage in 
violence to attain political ends.  Islamism and violent jihad are not new, but their 
international aspect, which is now taken for granted, is.  The collapse of the Cold War 
order, in part, and the diminished property of state sovereignty were instrumental in 
driving religious nationalists toward their “far enemy.”45   
By embracing violence, terrorist groups greatly increase their options to 
influence world politics.  Nuclear weapons might allow a terrorist group to destabilize 
a state and topple a government; they also add an intrinsic legitimacy to a group as 
that group takes on “some of the trappings of a state.”46  Chechen separatists in Russia 
have “dabbled with radiological weapons” and made numerous threats that suggest a 
willingness to use weapons of mass destruction should they gain access to them.47  
However, it is misleading to always consider state and non-state actors in opposition.   
We return now to the question of whether nuclear weapons have been, overall, 
a stabilizing or destabilizing force, both domestically and internationally, and whether 
more nuclear states will be better or worse for the peace and stability of the world.   
Kenneth Waltz argues that “more may be better.”48  At the domestic level, he 
believes fears that nuclear weapons will force a state to become either more 
authoritarian or less secure to internal threats (such as coups, insurgencies, and 
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terrorism) are overblown.  “Nuclear weapons are not likely to be used at home,” he 
says.49  However, should a non-state group gain access to nuclear weapons, that is 
precisely where they would be used.  At the regional level, he believes that the same 
forces that have constrained superpower behavior will constrain less powerful states 
as well.  However, as we shall see, the political and security dynamics between India 
and Pakistan are very different than they were between the United States and USSR.   
 Scott Sagan offers another view.  His argument centers on the increased 
chance of accidents as well as on uncertainty over precisely who might control 
nuclear weapons in less developed states, a civilian government or the military.  Both 
factors would greatly increase the difficulty of deterrence and the instability of the 
regime in power.50 
 This debate remains undecided.  For one, this issue is very hard to study in a 
systematic way without either examining deviant cases (the United States and the 
Soviet union, for example) or entertaining counter factual arguments.  In the next 
section, I will propose a systematic way of examining the role of nuclear weapons in 
international politics as applied to the Indian-Pakistani conflict. 
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Approach and Methods 
 
To summarize what has been discussed so far:  Nuclear weapons can 
contribute to the peace and stability of the international system, but only if deterrence 
is constructed: practically, institutionally, and normatively.  Deterrence doesn’t just 
happen.   
 Nuclear weapons allow a state to engage in coercive diplomacy.  They can 
also be a much cheaper way of establishing security than investing in massive 
conventional forces.  However, a state’s real options vis a vis the use of force are 
often constrained by the added attention of the international community and the 
balancing of other states.  This is the paradox of nuclear power:  nuclear weapons 
have increased state security while eroding state sovereignty; they have increased the 
potency of coercive diplomacy (at least for some states) while decreasing the 
relevance of military power overall.   
 Nuclear weapons, quite clearly, have made war harder.  However, to 
paraphrase Jeff Goldblum’s character in Jurassic Park, war will find a way.  During 
the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union engaged in war by proxy.51  Less 
powerful states cannot use other states to fight their wars, but they can use non-state 
actors.  Therefore, in less developed states, nuclear weapons will lead to a rise in non-
state violence. 
 A natural experiment presents itself as the best way to test this hypothesis.  
India and Pakistan have been at war from the very moment of their birth; in 1947 
British India was granted independence and partitioned into two states, predominantly 
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Muslim Pakistan and predominantly Hindu India.  Kashmir, the largest of a number of 
semi-autonomous princely states within British India, was caught between the new 
states, both literally and figuratively.  The population of Kashmir, which shared a 
border with both India and West Pakistan (present day Pakistan), was eighty percent 
Muslim by population.  However, its maharajah was Hindu and he initially refused to 
take sides.  When Pakistani troops, along with Muslim rebels from the British colonial 
army, attempted to seize the capitol of Kashmir, Srinagar, the maharajah fled to India 
and pledged loyalty.  The Indian army was quick to march into Kashmir and 
reestablish a tentative border; however, India was unable to retake the entirety of the 
state.  A divided Kashmir, with both India and Pakistan laying claim to the whole, 
remains to this day.52 Three major wars and a series of skirmishes and low-intensity 
guerrilla actions have taken place between India and Pakistan since 1947.   
 What makes this case so suited to testing the influence of nuclear weapons on 
interstate conflict is that it actually presents itself as three cases.  These cases vary on 
the independent variable  (the presence of nuclear weapons), but much else remains 
constant between the cases.  First, from 1948-1973, neither state had a nuclear 
weapons capability, which provides a useful control for establishing their baseline 
relationship.  In 1974, India detonated its first “peaceful nuclear explosion,” 
codenamed “Smiling Buddha.”53  By all accounts, India did not immediately move to 
weaponize nuclear technology; however the fact remains that it could have done so on 
very short notice.54  In the end, it made little difference to Pakistan, which began its 
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own nuclear weapons program only a year later.55  There is very little attention paid to 
this period in the literature; most authors (Waltz, Sagan, Kapur) seem to pretend that 
India and Pakistan both acquired nuclear weapons simultaneously in May of 1998.  
This, however, is not the case.  From 1974-1985, India possessed a nuclear capability, 
but Pakistan did not.  Beginning the late eighties, Pakistan acquired a nuclear 
capability, but did not test or weaponize this capability initially.  Still, this is a fact of 
which India was acutely aware.  It is hard to pinpoint exactly when Pakistan had the 
capability to build a bomb on short notice, but it was certainly well before its first test.  
Certainly by 1986 Pakistan’s nuclear capability was in no doubt, at least to India.  
This will become clear as the cases are presented.  So this will become the first year in 
case three.  In May of 1998, India detonated another five nuclear devices.  By the end 
of the month, Pakistan had detonated six of its own (one for each of India’s and 
another for India’s first in 1974; which, again, shows the importance of India’s first 
bomb).  Pakistan stunned the world with how quickly it was able to respond to India’s 
tests.  Clearly, the capability was there all along.  So, from 1986-present (2007 for the 
purposes of this study), both India and Pakistan have possessed nuclear weapons. 
 By treating each period as a separate case, a comparative analysis can 
determine the precise effect of the key variable of nuclear weapons; by treating the 
same conflict, involving the same states, as three separate cases, most variables can be 
keep the same--ceteris paribus.  However, the real world never conforms entirely to 
laboratory expectations.  One complication is the involvement of outside forces in the 
conflict, especially following the Cold War dynamic of bi-polarity.  The Soviet 
Union, as early as 1952, began to support India’s position on Kashmir, claiming that 
the British were using Kashmir as a wedge to retain some control of their former 
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empire; further, the Soviet Union pledged to be at India’s side should India need 
them.56  In 1954, Pakistan signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the 
United States, effectively balancing against the Indian alliance with the Soviet 
Union.57 
 The Cold War politicization of the Kashmir issue actually strengthens the 
comparative framework.  After the superpowers became involved, the United Nations 
“ceased to be a viable forum for the resolution of the Kashmiri dispute.”58  Just as 
with many other issues, the United States and Soviet Union came to stalemate in the 
Security Council over Kashmir.  Had only one superpower involved itself in the 
Kashmir conflict, this comparison would not work.  But, both superpowers took an 
interest and effectively canceled each other out, leaving the conflict very much in the 
hands of the Indians and Pakistanis themselves.   
 In addition, neither superpower must have provided a credible extended 
deterrence in the minds of the Indians and Pakistanis, as both undertook their own 
nuclear weapons programs.  The very fact that each nation undertook to build nuclear 
weapons, against the wishes of their superpower patrons, shows how limited the 
influence of the global powers were in South Asia.   
 In the case of the India-Pakistan conflict, as opposed to the global conflict 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, the outcome was not, and is not, 
over-determined.  No war between India and Pakistan has been sufficiently horrible to 
deter another war, certainly nothing approaching the horror of World War II for the 
allied powers.  Neither has either India or Pakistan seemed particularly content in its 
geopolitical position, although India’s discontentment seems more pronounced vis a 
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vis China than in relation to Pakistan.  Neither are there massive alliance systems that 
threaten to escalate a conflict to unimaginable proportions.  And there is no 
constructed identity between India and Pakistan as “civil enemies.”   
 Rather, if anything, this case seems crucial when one considers all the 
historical, ethnic, and religious factors that exacerbate conflict in the region, 
especially between the two countries.  If nuclear weapons can significantly alter 
patterns of violence here, then they can anywhere.   
 The dependent variable is non-state violence, which I define non-state 
violence as organized acts of aggression carried out by any entity other than the 
military apparatus of a state.  Non-state actors may engage in violence at the behest of 
the state; they may be funded or trained by the state, or both, but they are not direct 
appendages of the state; their interests are intrinsically different from a state’s.  Non-
state actors may wish to become a state, or seize control of an existing state’s 
bureaucratic infrastructure, but they are not there yet.   
 To measure state versus non-state violence I will use data from the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and the Center for the Study of Civil Wars at 
the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) in Oslo.  I have combined data from 
two datasets, the UCDP non-state conflict dataset and the UCDP/PRIO armed conflict 
dataset.  I have chosen these datasets for two reasons.  First, when combined they 
allow me to measure how the ratio of state versus non-state conflict has changed 
across my cases.  And second, the data runs from the beginning of case one to as near 
the end of case three as is possible (1948-2007), allowing me to get do accurate 
comparison across the entirety of the cases.   
The non-state conflict dataset records all conflicts with more than 25 battle 
deaths between 1947 and 2007 and categorizes them by type (interstate, intrastate, 
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extrasystemic non-state, and internationalized intra-state).  For my purposes, I am 
interested in the ratio or interstate conflicts to non-state conflicts as a whole.  A non-
state conflict is defined here as “the use of armed force between two organized armed 
groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 
battle-related deaths in a year”.59  However, this dataset does not record the number of 
fatalities that each conflict produced.  I wish to weigh each conflict by the number of 
resulting fatalities, so I have combined data from the UCDP/PIRO armed conflict 
dataset which does record these numbers.60  I have cross-referenced each event 
between the datasets and removed events outside the scope of my paper (events that 
did not involve either India or Pakistan).  However, these numbers will not tell the 
whole story.  So, in addition to these measures, I will attempt to build a more holistic 
picture of my three cases by consulting various histories and case studies.  My goal is 
to construct a convincing narrative that can be tested by via the comparative method.   
I make several theoretical assumptions along the way.  First, there are several 
real and persistent conditions of the international system.  Among these are anarchy 
and complex interdependence.  However, the effects of these structural conditions are 
not necessarily naturally occurring or persistent across time and space.  Rather, states 
construct various meanings and apply them to these conditions and then respond to 
those constructed meanings, rather than the condition itself.  The international system 
is constructed reflexively and over time patterns of interpretation develop and are 
institutionalized.  Deterrence is one such institutionalized pattern of constructed 
meaning.  To understand the contours of deterrence, nuclear or conventional, in a 
given situation, you must first understand the constructed patterns of meaning 
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between the principal actors in the deterrence framework.  Therefore, a qualitative 
approach is necessary to truly explain the interactions of India and Pakistan (or any 
states in the international system).  I will examine both institutions (including culture) 
and rational actors at several levels of analysis (the system, the state, and the 
individual).  Such a broad approach is necessary because nuclear weapons have an 
impact at all these levels.  Further, states are shaped both by institutions and by the 
individuals that govern them, as well as by the constraints of the international system 
(which are constructed by individuals and consolidated by institutions).   
 In the first case, I examine the relationship of India and Pakistan without 
nuclear weapons to get a baseline for comparison across the cases, focusing both on 
state and non-state violence.  In the second case, the role of India’s nuclear weapons 
are highlighted and, as no major interstate violence took place during this period, the 
focus shifts to the non-state level.  Finally, in the third case, Pakistan’s nuclear 
weapons infuse the Kashmir conflict with new energy, and while the rate of interstate 
violence rises, rates of non-state violence skyrocket.  The rates fall in the early 1990s, 
but remain high compared to pre-1980s levels.  This can be seen in the following 
graph. 
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Figure 1:  Indo Pakistani Battle Deaths by Year (UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict 
Dataset) 
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Case 1: 1948-1973 
 
 Kashmir is a crossroads, both geographically and philosophically.  It is here 
that Asia and the Middle East truly come together; three nations claim parts of this 
tiny region.  India, in fact, claims it all.  Pakistan claims most of the Western areas, 
and China claims a small portion of the North.  Where Pakistan and China’s claims 
overlap, Pakistan has ceded territory in exchange for leverage against its true rival, 
India.  India is perhaps more concerned strategically with China; however, Pakistan 
remains a thorn in its side that will not go away.   
 Kashmir is also a crossroads of religions, cultures, and political ideologies.  
Pakistan is culturally and religiously distinct, yet its identity as a modern nation is 
inextricably linked with India.  Pakistan lacks a positive national identity of its own; 
rather, a strong Pakistani nationalism directed against India cements many diverse 
ethnic groups into a nation.  “This distinction between nationalism and nation is not a 
rhetorical one.  Nationalism is an ideology, be it based on territorial or ethnic notions.  
On the other hand, a nation is a social construction.”61  Pakistan is a nation of many 
nationalities or sub-nations--its borders are porous and the central power lacks direct 
control over wide swaths of the country.  However, the national ideology of Pakistan 
is much more integrated across ethnic groups.  In many ways, it is an ideological 
state, constructed in opposition to India.62  India is Pakistan’s eternal Other.  To 
understand the India-Pakistan conflict, an understanding of this dynamic is 
prerequisite.   
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 Pakistan was created to be the homeland of Muslims living in British India.  
On August 15, 1947, by order of the British Parliament, India was formally granted 
independence and what was one nation became two.  A demarcation line was drawn 
between areas of majority Muslim and majority Hindu occupation; everything on one 
side became India and everything on the other became Pakistan (then East and West 
Pakistan).  However, this left millions of people living on the “wrong” side of the 
border.  This led to one of the largest mass migrations of peoples in modern history.  
It was also one of the bloodiest; over one million lives were lost to ethnic, religious, 
and nationalist violence on the roads between India and Pakistan.63  Caught between 
the violence and political machinations of the Partition were the regions of Jammu 
and Kashmir.   
 On the eve of Partition, the Maharaja of the Princely State of Kashmir, Hari 
Singh, found himself caught between two options, neither of them optimal.  On the 
one hand, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s support of the National Conference, a 
party opposing the Maharaja, led Singh to doubt that he would retain power under 
Indian rule.  However, as a Hindu himself, ruling a predominantly Muslim population, 
the prospects of Pakistani rule did not look much better.  The Maharaja desired 
independence for Kashmir; however, neither India nor Pakistan could tolerate this, 
and tensions between the three parties continued to grow, as did violence at the non-
state level.   
 In Muslim-majority areas, Hindu militias carried out a series of massacres 
against the local populations, killing upwards of 200,000 and displacing many more.64  
Likewise, Muslim riots, with the support of former (Muslim) soldiers in the British-
Indian Army, targeted and killed similar numbers of Hindus.  These same soldiers led 
                                                          
63Praveen Swami, India, Pakistan, and the Secret Jihad:  The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947-2004 (New 
York:  Routledge, 2007), 18. 
64Ibid., 15 
29 
 
a rebellion in the north of the Jammu and Kashmir territory and joined officially with 
Pakistan.   
 The success of this rebellion encouraged the Pakistani military that very little 
force would be necessary to topple the Maharaja’s regime.  So, in the summer of 
1947, irregulars with the support of the Pakistani military pushed into the heart of 
Kashmir.  The Maharaja turned to India for help, but India would only agree to 
commit troops if Singh brought Kashmir under the direct control of India.  He agreed 
and Indian and Pakistani troops clashed in the first Indo-Pakistani War.  This 
agreement is the primary legal basis for India’s claim to Kashmir today; however, 
Pakistan has always maintained that the accession was illegitimate.   
 The months leading up to Partition and the first few months after marked a 
time of dramatic violence, the vast majority of it non-state violence falling along 
traditional ethno-religious lines.  However, once Kashmir picked a side (or, rather, 
once Pakistan believed Kashmir had picked a side), the ethno-religious conflict 
crystallized into a border dispute between sovereign states.  Pakistan’s claim on 
Kashmir was still driven by an irredentist concern for cultural contiguity, but the 
Pakistani government was at least equally concerned with the strategic importance of 
Kashmir. 
One glance at the map was enough to show that Pakistan’s military security 
would be seriously jeopardized if Indian troops came to be stationed along 
Pakistan’s western border.  Once India got the chance, she could establish 
such stations anywhere within a few miles of the 180 miles long vital road 
and rail route between Lahore and Pindi.  In the event of war, these stations 
would be a dangerous threat to our most important civil and military lines of 
communication....From an economic point of view the position was equally 
perilous.  Our agricultural economy was dependent particularly upon the 
rivers coming out of Kashmir....What then would be our position if Kashmir 
was in Indian hands?65   
 
 That Pakistan would retain Kashmir seemed to the Pakistanis necessary to 
their continued existence as a state.  Pakistan, thus, sponsored the armed revolt inside 
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Kashmir.  The rebels were organized around a core of active Pakistani military 
personnel.  Further, they were armed with Pakistani weapons secretly diverted into the 
region by Pakistan’s civilian government.66  While Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan 
wished to keep Pakistani regulars, uniformed or otherwise, out of the conflict, 
Pakistani troops were deeply involved with the rebellion both inside Pakistan 
(organization and logistics) and inside the territories of Jammu and Kashmir.   
 However, even for Pakistan’s significant involvement, neither the military nor 
the civilian government was able to maintain much operational control over the 
rebels.  Uprisings quickly turned into massacres, tribesmen from Pakistan poured into 
Kashmir, “their indiscriminate ‘liberating’...terrorizing Hindu, Sikh, and Muslim 
villager alike”.67  It was the brutality of these first uprisings that pushed the Maharaja 
Singh into action and, ironically, sealed the loss of Jammu and Kashmir for Pakistan.  
However, Pakistani forces were able to seize about a third of the territory before 
Indian forces halted their advance.  Once India committed troops into Kashmir, 
Pakistan abandoned its facade and committed uniformed troops as well in support of 
their Azad Kashmir (Free Kashmir) counterparts.68   
 By New Year’s Eve of 1948, both sides had dug in and, the mountainous 
terrain heavily favoring defense, further gains by either side were only going to come 
at a steep price.69  Prime Minister Nehru and his top military leadership realized that 
only by cutting off Pakistani support to Azad Kashmir and the ongoing insurgency 
could the war be brought to a close.  Nehru wished to expand the war into Pakistan, 
but could find neither the resources nor the political will to do so.  Thus, in many 
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respects the 1947-48 war never ended.  Neither side could accept the status quo, nor 
could they change it.   
 Rather than expand the war, on the advice of the British government, India 
referred the matter to the United Nations Security Council.  The Security Council 
passed two resolutions calling for the removal of Pakistani troops from Kashmir and 
the draw-down of Indian troops to a level sufficient only for the maintenance of law 
and order.  The resolutions also called for a plebiscite to determine the wishes of the 
people of Kashmir.  Neither India nor Pakistan complied with these resolutions, 
however, and Kashmir remained locked in an armed truce between the two countries 
for the next decade and a half. 
 Meanwhile, India had other concerns.  In addition to border disputes with 
Pakistan, the British withdrawal also left India with a disputed border between it and 
its northern neighbor, The People’s Republic of China (PRC).  Initially, India made a 
series of concessions, hoping to appease rather than confront the PRC, but this 
approach soon backfired.  Nehru wished to limit defense spending and focus instead 
on domestic poverty programs; he was also worried about giving the military too 
much power in domestic politics.  However, as China pushed for even more 
concessions on India’s Himalayan border, Nehru quickly found himself backed into a 
corner.  Nehru went so far as to hide the dispute from the Indian parliament, for fear 
of upsetting right-wing opposition parties, until the border clashes at Kongka Pass in 
1958 made this impossible.   
 Shortly after these early skirmishes, India began its “forward policy,” sending 
small patrols of troops into the disputed territory.  This policy “amounted to a flawed 
attempt to pursue a strategy of compellence--the use of force to induce an adversary to 
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undo a hostile act.”70  Rather than compel China to give up its territorial claims, these 
acts provoked China into war.   
 The 1962 Sino-India war marked a drastic change in India defense posture.  
Dramatic losses convinced Indian leaders to undertake a significant military 
modernization program.  And, yet again, Indian defense policy proved to have 
unforeseen side effects.  While preoccupied with China, India did little to consider the 
effects of its military posture on its smaller, weaker neighbor, Pakistan.  India 
effectively created a security dilemma with Pakistan.  After all, India’s growing 
military might just as readily be turned against Pakistan as China.  Furthermore, 
Pakistan’s window of opportunity on Kashmir seemed to be closing.   
 In 1965, Pakistan sent irregular forces into Indian-controlled Kashmir to 
foment local unrest and pave the way for uniformed troops to come.  However, many 
of these Pakistani militia were turned over to the authorities and India was alerted.  
Nonetheless, Pakistan stuck with the plan and committed regular troops.  Pakistan’s 
incursion into Kashmir, across the cease-fire line established in 1947, prompted an 
Indian counter attack, also across the cease-fire line into Pakistani controlled Azad 
Kasmir.  What began as an attempt by Pakistan at producing an insurgency within 
Kashmir quickly became full scale war as Pakistan and India committed both infantry 
and armored divisions as well as their respective air forces to the conflict.  Important 
to note here is the ease with which Pakistan escalated the already unwinnable conflict.  
With the infiltrators discovered and the local uprisings revealed to be a pipe dream, 
the Pakistani military argued that it was time to cut losses and accept defeat 
gracefully.71  However, Zulfiquar ali Bhutto, then minister of foreign affairs to 
President Ayub Khan, argued that such a course of action would signal weakness to 
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India and provoke future aggression.  Despite the risk of massive India retaliation, 
Khan went along with Bhutto’s assessment.  By comparing Pakistan’s willingness to 
fight in this case and its lack of fear vis a vis escalation, the effects of nuclear 
weapons in later cases become pronounced.   
 When Pakistani forces made key tactical gains within Indian-controlled 
Kashmir, India escalated the conflict a degree more when it attacked across the 
international border near Lahore, successfully taking pressure off Indian troops in 
Kashmir for the time being.  A series of large set-piece tank battles ensued that 
September.  But Indian forces quickly bogged down, failing to capture the city of 
Sialkot in north eastern Punjab.  India found itself caught in a stalemate.  By 21 
September, India had accepted the terms of U.N. Security Council resolution 211, 
which demanded an immediate cease-fire, and hostilities came to an end in the second 
major Indo-Pakistani war.   
 This war marks a transition from “informal war,” where Pakistan supported 
the Kashmir insurgency rather haphazardly, to a much more coherent movement 
organized around a “master cell” that answered directly to the Pakistani Inter-Services 
Intelligence (ISI) Directorate.72  The master cell was integral to Operation Gibraltar, 
which began the 1965 war.  A communique from August of that year, from Major-
General Akhatar Hussain Malik to a leader of the Master Cell read: 
You will infiltrate across CFL [Cease Fire Line] to operate behind 
enemy disposition...and cause max attrition of enemy potential....  You will 
not undertake set piece attacks and tie down our own troops unnecessarily 
thereby suffering casualties.  The pattern must be to concentrate at a 
preselected target at a fixed time, carry out raids, inflict max casualties, cause 
max damage and disperse in different directions.73 
 
The cease-fire after the 1965 war did not put an end to the operations of the 
Master Cell within Jammu and Kashmir; however Kashmiri police, together with 
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Indian counter-intelligence agents, soon did.  This would mark an end to the highly 
organized insurgency with direct ties to the Pakistani state and would begin another 
phase of the Kashmir resistance which would be cemented six years later after 
Pakistan’s outstanding defeat in the 1971 war, culminating with its loss of East 
Pakistan.   
The third and final major war of this period (1948-1973) stands out as an 
anomaly in the Indo-Pakistani conflict.  It does so for two reasons.  First, this war was 
not over Kashmir.  And second, it was instigated not by Pakistan, but by India.  The 
1970 Pakistani national elections left a political division between West Pakistan led 
by the Pakistani People’s Party of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto) and East Pakistan, led by the 
Awami League.  No power sharing arrangement could be reached and the Western 
government eventually fell back on the support of the military.  The Pakistani military 
had, from the beginning, been dominated by ethnic Punjabis and Pashtuns from the 
West.  East Pakistan had been spared the brunt of Indian aggression in both previous 
wars; “a Pakistani military strategy that had long claimed that ‘the defense of the east 
lies in the west...’ facilitated the India politico-military decision not to pursue 
significant war aims in the eastern sector [of Pakistan].”74  In effect, the Pakistani 
military had left East Pakistan at the mercy of India.  This decision, combined with 
Indian forbearance in the east, led to a pronounced schism between the Punjabi and 
Pashtun West and the Bengali East. 
In 1966, Sheikh Rahman, leader of the Awami League, had called for a 
restructuring of the federal relationship between East and West, essentially, home 
rule.  Among his demands were the establishment of an East Pakistani militia and 
currency, separate from the military and currency of West Pakistan.  The West was 
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heavily dependent on the East’s textile industry, but the relationship was one of highly 
asymmetric interdependence.  “In 1970, almost half of East Pakistan’s industrial 
assets were controlled by six non-Bengali industrialists.”75  The inequality, coupled 
with the high rates of economic growth under President Ayub Khan, fueled Bengali 
resentment toward the West. 
The country leaped forward in economic terms during the Ayub era, but the 
political rights of the people were buried in the process.  Bengalis felt it more 
because their presence in the civil-military bureaucracy was only symbolic.  
In the army, the most important institution in the country, there were only 300 
Bengali officers out of 6000.76 
 
 In the 1970 elections, the Awami League won 160 of 162 seats in the East and 
none in the West, while the Pakistani People’s Party won 81 of 138 seats in the West 
and none in the East.  However, the situation that followed was reminiscent of the 
1956 elections that led to a military coup and the installation of Ayub Khan as 
President.  Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, head of the PPP, made it clear that the ruling party of 
West Pakistan “would not sit in the opposition,” electoral defeat notwithstanding.77  
When no coalition government could be formed between the two literal wings of 
Pakistani politics, the Awami League began to consider the possibility of secession.  
President Yahya Khan called off the opening of the National Assembly only two days 
before its first scheduled meeting.78  Shortly thereafter, Sheikh Rahman took charge 
of the administration of East Pakistan, asserting para-constitutional authority in what 
amounted to a de-facto declaration of independence.  In the Spring of 1971, Rahman 
was arrested, and the Pakistani military responded with a crackdown on the 
population of East Pakistan in an attempt to deracinate Bengali dissidents before 
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Rahman’s nascent separatist movement could take root.  However, this crackdown 
was exceptionally broad in scope.   
On March 26, 1971, Yahya Khan ordered the initiation of Operation 
Searchlight, a brutal military pogrom directed at people Pakistan claimed 
were its citizens.  Pakistan’s military had believed that a short display of force 
would serve its purpose; instead, the ‘Bengali population stood full square 
behind their arrested leader, Mujibur Rahman.’  In response to this defiance, 
the Pakistani Army unleashed its full wrath, ‘raping, murdering and even 
massacring whole villages, women and children included.’  Elements of the 
Islamist Jammat-e-Islami party, eager to demonstrate their support for the 
Army, joined in the killing of those they claimed were ‘enemies of Islam.’  
...West Pakistani troops killed at least 30,000 people.  Among them were 
hundreds of the East Bangladesh Rifles who had refused to disarm when 
ordered to do so at the outset....  Some 17,000 soldiers crossed the border into 
India over the coming months, along with millions of civilian refugees--
student activists, politicians, and ordinary people who had come under attack 
for no other reason than their ethnicity.79 
 
Millions of displaced Bengali began to cross the Indian border to escape the 
harsh tactics of the Pakistani military.  Within months the refugee population 
approached ten million.80  India was unable or unwilling to absorb so many refugees 
into its already large, factious, and fractious population; rather, “Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi...concluded that it was cheaper to resort to war...than to absorb the 
refugees.”81  Prior to undertaking hostilities, Gandhi signed a treaty with the Soviet 
Union that included an important mutual defense clause.  In large part, this was done 
to dissuade China from coming to the aid of Pakistan, an ally.  Only two years 
previously China had fought an embarrassing war with the Soviet Union and was not 
eager to risk another conflict.  Pakistan’s alliance with the United States and China, 
and India’s with the Soviet Union effectively stymied any outside interests in the 
conflict.  In the Spring of 1971, India took a page from Pakistan’s own playbook and 
undertook to fund a nascent Bengali insurgency, the Mukti Bahini.82   
 By December of 1971, an increasingly successful insurgency in the East had 
left Pakistan with few options.  Indian provocation became increasingly intolerable.  
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Frustrated with India’s support of the Bengali insurgency, on December 3, Pakistan 
launched air strikes at Indian military bases in the north (close to the India-East 
Pakistan border).  This was what the Indian leadership had been waiting for.  The 
Pakistani strikes effectively legitimized a war Gandhi and those around her had 
wanted all along.  The Indian Air Force launched counter-strikes immediately and 
within days had established air superiority over Pakistan.  Taking advantage of its air 
power, India struck targets deep inside Western Pakistan, including Peshawar, the 
major port city of Karachi, and the capital, Islamabad.  Further, the Indian navy 
bombarded the cities of Jewani and Gawadar in the country’s far west.  While India’s 
aims in the 1971 war were fairly limited, its means must not have seemed so at the 
time, neither to Pakistan nor to the United States.  As a show of force meant to 
dissuade India from vivisecting Pakistan, the United States dispatched a carrier battle 
group to the Bay of Bengal.  However, by the time the carrier arrived on station, India 
had already succeeded in routing Pakistani forces in the east and capturing Dhaka, the 
modern capitol of Bangladesh.   
 Unlike in 1948 and 1965, in 1971 India was unconcerned with fears of 
escalation.  Pakistan was thoroughly outmatched in every way, completely at the 
mercy of Indian military might.  Bilateral talks in May of 1972 re-introduced the 
Kashmir issue to the discourse.  In exchange for nearly 90,000 prisoners of war, 
Pakistan’s government under President Yahya Kahn agreed (once again) to settle the 
Kashmir issue without violence.  Further, Pakistan was forced to make territorial 
concessions; the agreed shift in nomenclature from “Cease-Fire Line” to “Line of 
Control” reflected Indian gains made as a direct result of the 1971 war.   
After the 1965 and 1971 wars, India embraced a hard-line position on 
Kashmir.  Why peacefully negotiate away what Pakistan had been unable to take 
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through war?  Further, neither of Pakistan’s major alliances had been of any use 
during these wars.  China was obviously unwilling to intervene and provoke a wider 
regional war with India.  And the United States had responded to the 1965 war with 
an arms embargo on both India and Pakistan.  In 1971, the United States did posture 
militarily against India, but too little too late to forestall the loss of half of Pakistan’s 
territory.  In these conflicts Pakistan had, unwittingly, tipped a losing hand and India 
was no longer afraid to call its bluff.  This dynamic would remain in place until 
Pakistan acquired a nuclear capability several decades later.   
 The Peace treaty that ended the 1965 war, mediated by the Soviet Union, left 
President Ayub Khan in a precarious position.  While the treaty left Pakistan with 
marginally more territory than it had begun with, it in many ways sealed a perpetual 
stalemate on the issue.  Both India and Pakistan pledged to resolve the matter non-
militarily.  Further, the treaty did not include any reference to the plebiscite demanded 
by the United Nations in 1948, leaving both pro-Indian and pro-Pakistani Kashmiris 
unhappy.83  The 1966 student riots in Lahore and Sialkot were a direct result of this 
dissatisfaction.  Many Kashmiri refugees living within Pakistan felt that President 
Khan had betrayed them and the nation by conceding, before the Soviets and the 
world, Pakistan’s non-negotiable claim on the entirety of Kashmir.84  The Pakistani 
nation served as an echo chamber, amplifying discontent over the Kashmir issue and 
channeling it both against India (back into the Kashmir insurgency), and also against 
the Pakistani state itself.  The Pakistani military was in an equally precarious position, 
having to maintain some semblance of support for the Kashmir insurgency without 
provoking India into another war.   
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 Political change in India also complicated Pakistan’s delicate balance vis a vis 
the Kashmir insurgency.  Only hours after the treaty with Pakistan was signed, Indian 
Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri died of a heart attack.  The leadership of India’s 
dominant political party, the Indian National Congress, were divided on who should 
succeed him, but finally agreed on a “safe” choice whom they believed would not 
upset the political status quo; Jawaharlal Nehru’s daughter, Indira Ghandi, would 
serve in the interim until a true successor could be appointed.  Moraji Desai and 
Rammanohar Lohia, prominent conservatives within the National Congress, dubbed 
Ghandi a “dumb doll.”85  Her aggressive leadership, especially in the Kashmir issue, 
would prove them quite wrong.  In 1968, Ghandi ordered the creation of a dedicated 
espionage agency and even managed to secure state-of-the-art surveillance technology 
from the United States in return for feeding the United States intelligence on China.86  
India’s new spy agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) managed to put 
external pressure on Pakistan and its proxies inside Kashmir at the same time as 
Pakistani citizens and Kashmiri nationalists were putting internal pressure on the 
regime of Ayub Khan.   
Indeed, very soon after its formation, the RAW began funding the Bangladeshi 
insurgency, fighting fire with fire, so to speak, and formulating plans to establish an 
independent state in East Pakistan.  One plot, foiled in 1967 by Pakistani counter-
intelligence, involved the assassination of Khan himself.87  This plan, to be carried out 
by Bangladeshi nationals, very likely began in the upper echelons of the Indian 
intelligence wing.  In response to this plot, Khan put over fifty East Pakistani citizens 
on trial, including Sheikh Rahman, head of the Awami league.  Rahman enjoyed 
immense popularity within East Pakistan and the backlash against the Pakistani 
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government was immediate and severe.88  The unrest begun in later 1967 would 
eventually necessitate martial law within East Pakistan and would also lead to the 
ousting of Khan, who had himself come to power by coup.  Indeed, the coup that 
brought Khan to power in 1958 was motivated by a power struggle between the East 
Pakistani Awami league and a number of fractious West Pakistani political parties.  
The 1956 elections shifted power from the West to the East (where a majority of the 
population lived); this was unacceptable to the country’s military and feudal elite, 
which were concentrated within the Punjab.  So, in 1958, the military abrogated the 
constitution and deposed the East Pakistani prime minister, Huseyn Shaheed 
Suhrawardy, instead appointing the head of the military, Iskandar Mirza, President.  
Mirza was himself deposed less than a month later by Khan.   
 To borrow an analogy from Joseph Nye, the Indo-Pakistani conflict could be 
compared to a game of three dimensional chess.89  On the top board is the system 
level characteristic of bi-polarity which defined Indian and Pakistani relations to the 
superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union.  On the middle board is the 
level of the state.  And on the lower board is the national level, the level of the sub-
state actor:  ethno-religious movements, insurgent groups, terrorist organizations.   
Conceptions of power differ at each level.  But power at one level is inherently 
dependent on power at the level below.  Pakistan’s power as a state is intimately 
connected to the power of ethnic and religious factions within Pakistan; the state’s 
military power vis a vis India is also tied directly to the power of its sub-state proxies.  
Pakistan’s leadership was chiefly aware of this in 1953 when Islamist uprisings 
necessitated martial law in Lahore.90  Later that year, as a means of co-opting the 
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power of the Islamist movement within the state, Pakistan declared itself an Islamic 
Republic.   
Pakistan has been a state since 1947, but it has had a very hard time 
conceiving of itself as a nation, despite intense, sometimes competing, nationalisms 
running through Pakistani identity: anti-Indian nationalism, Muslim nationalism, 
increasingly Islamist nationalism, and most recently, nuclear nationalism.   
Before continuing, some definitions are necessary.  Nationalism is an ideology 
that defines what it means to be a member of a particular group; it is an inherently 
exclusionary ideology.  However, nationalism is not sufficient for the existence of a 
nation.  Rather, nationalism is fuel; a nation is a vehicle.  A nation is a social 
construction, an “imagined community” build upon a given nationalist ideology.91  A 
nation is the idea of a state that members of that state carry around in their heads. To 
further complicate matters, a state is a political entity which maintains a monopoly on 
violence within a given territory.92  A nation is built of people; a state is built of 
institutions.   
Pakistan is effectively a state without a single, coherent nation.  There is no 
vehicle for Pakistani identity.  However, there are strong currents of nationalism in 
Pakistan, an excess of fuel, as it were, and no shortage of potential matches.    The 
British partitioned the subcontinent based on a faulty idea that nationalism was rooted 
in givens, language or religion, for instance.  It’s hard to fault them; this was the 
conventional understanding through the middle of the century.93  Pakistan was created 
as a Muslim nation with the idea that Islam was a sufficient foundation upon which to 
build a nation.  “Nationalism,” however, “is not the awakening of nations to self-
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consciousness:  it invents nations where they do not exist.”94  Even Islam was 
insufficient to overcome ethnic cleavages in Pakistan, though the Muslim elite tried to 
leverage Islamic symbols to shape a strong nationalist identity within British India 
before partition.95  This was reasonably successful only because of high levels of 
discrimination against Muslims by the Hindi majority.  Islam provided a relatively 
weak cultural basis for a Pakistani state, but Hindi discrimination fomented high 
levels of separatist feelings within the Muslim population of British India.96 
Mohammad Ali Jinnah is the father of modern Pakistan.  Before 
independence, he led the All-India Muslim League, a powerful Muslim separatist 
group.  In 1947, he became the first Governor-General of the independent state of 
Pakistan.  Jinnah advanced a two-nation policy for British India.   
Islam and Hinduism are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, 
different and distinct social orders....  The Hindus and the Muslims belong to two 
different religious philosophies, social customs, and literatures....  To Yoke together 
two such nations under a single State, one as a numerical minority and the other as a 
majority, must lead to growing discontent and the final destruction of any fabric that 
may be so built up for the government of such a state.97   
 
 However, ironically, the same might be said for modern Pakistan:  simply 
replace Muslim and Hindu with Punjabi, Pashtun, and half a dozen other ethnicities, 
each with its own history, culture, language or dialect, and interpretation of Islam.   
 Indeed, simply examine the state’s name.  The suffix -stan is an Indo-Aryan 
marker meaning “land of.”  Afghanistan, for example, is the land of the Afghans; 
Tajikistan, the land of the Tajiks.  The name Pakistan, however, has no such literal 
meaning.  Rather, it is an acronym.  P stands for Punjab, A for Afghan (actually the 
Pashtuns of the North-West Frontier Province), K for Kashmir, S for Sindh, and Tan 
for Baluchistan.  That a name can unite such disparate peoples seems incredibly 
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naive. But, if it can, the importance of Kashmir to the idea of the Pakistani state is 
apparent; it is integral to the very name.   
 Very early the Punjabis came to dominate both the civilian and military 
bureaucracy of Pakistan.  The adoption of Urdu as the national language solidified 
this domination and began the process that would eventually lead to the break-off of 
Bangladesh.  The 1954 Bengali demonstrations in East Pakistan were met with 
repressive measures by the military and central government, watering the seed of 
Bengali nationalism that would blossom almost two decades later into a separate 
nation-state.98   
 Both India and Pakistan are states comprised, at least in part, from displaced 
peoples.  Britain attempted to manage ethno-religious conflict through Partition and 
facilitated population transfers between Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority 
Pakistan.  Partition theory is based on the logic of the security dilemma extended to 
the sub-state level.99  Weak states create within them a state of anarchy which causes 
individuals to mobilize along ethnic lines.  Ethnic groups arm to facilitate their own 
security.  But, small arms are even harder to differentiate between offensive and 
defensive capability than large ones.  No faction has an interest in disarming until an 
outside agency, such as a state or international organization, can ensure protection for 
all parties.100   
 Kin-states may also be tempted to intervene when their co-ethnic populations 
are in danger.  “If warring groups are not completely separated into defensible 
enclaves, the ethnic security dilemma will remain unresolved, perpetuating conflicts 
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and provoking interstate conflicts by drawing the minority’s kin state into the 
conflict.”101  However, the population transfers necessary to ensure a successful 
partition “are associated with significant loss of life and property as well as human 
rights violations.”102  This was certainly the case during the Partition of India and 
Pakistan.  “Moreover, partition through state creation risks transforming internal 
conflicts into even deadlier interstate wars.  Territorial partition...encourages 
secessionist efforts...while creating authoritarian statelets whose leaders are left 
unaccountable to the people.”103 
 Indeed, this theory describes the relation of Pakistan to India from Partition 
until India’s acquisition of nuclear weapons very well, explaining how intra-state 
conflict becomes inter-state conflict.  Partition failed because the British failed to 
understand that Islam was not monolithic in the sub-continent; rather, it was 
incredibly factious.  Sunni/Shia conflicts which would be pronounced in Pakistan 
after Partition, were mostly absent before it.104  Partition failed because the requisite 
population transfers were incredibly bloody, leaving anger and resentment on both 
sides.  Partition failed and perhaps even agitated Pakistan’s irredentism which led to 
conflict between the newly partitioned states.  
 Partition left Pakistan with a weak state incapable of dealing with its 
heterogeneous population without resorting to a nationalism of opposition vis a vis 
India.  Charles Tilly and Jeffrey Herbst have both argued that war is necessary to the 
consolidation of modern states.105  “War made the state and the state made war.”106  
                                                          
101 Op. cit., Jenne 2010, 124. 
102 Ibid., 124. 
103 Ibid., 124-25. 
104 Op. cit., Jaffrelot, 115. 
105 See Charles Tilly “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State Back 
In (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1985); and Jeffery Herbst, “War and the State in Africa,” 
International Security 14, no. 4 (Spring 1990): 117-139. 
106 Charles Tilly, The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press, 1975). 
45 
 
Accepting this as fact, Pakistan is an excellent example.  Had its government not been 
able to channel intra-state conflict into inter-state war, Pakistan would not have 
survived as a single state; in all likelihood, it would be a failed state along the lines of 
Somalia or Afghanistan.  Indeed, as it is, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA) amount to a failed state within a state. 
 Georg Sorensen has argued that the defining problem of the international 
system is no longer the security dilemma, which occurs between sovereign states, but 
rather, an insecurity dilemma that plagues primarily weak states.107  Weak states pose 
dangers to neighboring states in the form of refugees, communicable diseases, and 
terrorism; as well, they pose dangers to their own citizens.   
 As a category, all weak states share three characteristics.  First, a feeble 
economy with large sectors of the population living outside of the formal economy. 
Pakistan has a modern economy which is quite strong in some sectors, but large tracts 
of the country do not participate in or benefit from it.  Much of the country, rather, 
retains a subsistence agricultural economy with feudal organizational structures.108  
Further, in relation to India, Pakistan suffers from many structural impediments; its 
economy simply cannot keep up.  Second, weak states typically lack a strong national 
identity or “community of citizens.”109  Pakistan has an exceptionally weak national 
identity.  And third, weak states lack institutions responsive to the needs of their 
citizens and effective in meeting those needs.110  
 In effect, there is anarchy within the state in the same way that there is anarchy 
on the international level.  The regime and other powerful non-state actors become 
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synonymous with states on the international level; each acts in its own interests and as 
one becomes more secure, the others necessarily become less secure.  The elite may 
fortify themselves, but cannot do much for the average citizen caught between 
conflicting groups.   
As seen from the perspective of the populations of weak states, this is an 
insecurity dilemma, because they cannot know what to expect from the state; 
furthermore, strategies of resistance and support may be counterproductive in 
terms of achieving security. The government’s primary task ideally should be 
to provide security for its population, but instead it makes up the greatest 
potential threat to people within its boundaries.111 
  
 In Pakistan, the most powerful non-state group has been the Armed Forces.  
Indeed, at times it has been synonymous with the state, and has kept a wary eye on the 
civilian government when it has not been.  Another aspect to the insecurity dilemma 
in Pakistan is that as the military strengthens its defenses vis a vis India, it leaves 
itself more open to attack from indigenous jihadist groups.  As already mentioned 
Pakistan has attempted to combat this problem by adopting an Islamist identity and by 
funding the very groups that threaten to destabilize the Pakistani state; turning them 
outward against India.  The danger is that Pakistan could lose control of these groups 
and find itself facing adversaries that the state itself has armed and trained.   
 So, a baseline relationship has been established.  From 1947-1973, India and 
Pakistan fought all three of the major wars that have occurred between the countries.  
Further, each state provided funding and training to non-state actors in order to wage 
proxy war against the other.  Neither India nor Pakistan was reluctant to engage the 
other in conflict; neither did either worry significantly about escalation.  With the 
introduction of an Indian nuclear weapon to the conflict, the change would be 
pronounced.   
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Case 2:  1974-1985 
 
 In May of 1974, India detonated its first nuclear device, Pokhran-I, code-
named “Smiling Buddha.”  This single test dramatically changed the balance of power 
on the sub-continent; or rather, it changed perceptions of that balance of power, 
especially within Pakistan.  India was greatly concerned with its northern neighbor, 
China, which had trounced India in the 1962 war and had tested its own nuclear 
weapon only two years later.   
 Further, U.S. president Richard Nixon’s overtures to China throughout 1971, 
and his visit in 1972, increasingly made India wary of China’s global position.  
Indeed, the U.S. had deployed a carrier task force to the Bay of Bengal that same year 
as a show of force against India’s war in East Pakistan (modern Bangladesh).  
Superpower balancing, India feared, was no longer enough to hold off an aggressive 
China with new economic ties to the United States.  Rather, Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi felt that India needed its own nuclear deterrent.  China was seated at the 
United Nations in October of 1971 and this proved to be the straw that broke the 
camel’s back.  India had been pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, if not the 
weapons themselves, since the late 1940s.  In 1972, Prime Minister Gandhi authorized 
the construction of a device to be tested.  Only two years later, it was.   
 India’s potential as a nuclear weapons state was now a real and kinetic force 
on the sub-continent.  And as Pakistan’s potential grew, many in Islamabad, 
Washington, and Moscow began to fear a preemptive strike on India’s part.112  In 
1984, these fears reached a head when it appeared that India was mobilizing 
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squadrons of fighter-bombers for an airstrike.  The crisis that ensued proved to be the 
first nuclearized dispute between India and Pakistan.   
 Several years before the 1984 crisis, Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan to aid 
a faltering Marxist regime in its fight with an Islamic insurgency.  The United States 
redoubled its aid to Pakistan in an effort to “raise the cost of potential aggression”113 
and to send a message to the Soviets.  At the same time, the United States began 
covertly supporting the Afghan insurgency by funneling money and weapons through 
Pakistan.   
 At this same time, the constraints of bipolarity on the region began to slacken.  
India was increasingly upset by Soviet actions in Afghanistan.  At the same time, the 
special economic relationship between India and the Soviet Union began to lose some 
of its utility for India.  India economic liberalization throughout the 1980s brought 
greater levels of outside investment, including investment from the United States and 
other Western countries.  The subcontinent, like the world more generally, was 
beginning a shift to the “unipolar moment.”   
 Pakistan, however, was in a moment of crisis.  The relatively peaceful decade 
since the 1971 war hid Pakistan’s inner turmoil.  Pakistan’s utter defeat, and its loss of 
half its territory, prompted a crisis of national identity.  If Islam was not able to unite 
East and West Pakistan, for how much longer would it united the disparate peoples of 
West Pakistan itself.  India, Pakistan’s eternal Other, seemed powerful beyond 
challenge and its power was only growing as it came more fully into the Western 
economic system.  Pakistan, however, for all the military and economic aid it received 
from the United States, faced such a structural deficit vis a vis India that any 
semblance of economic or military parity with that country seemed a distant memory.   
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 At this time, Pakistanis turned their attention inward.  The Pakistani 
government under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto cut off funding to the Kashmir insurgency.  
The loss of their main source of funding set the insurgency back in many ways.  But 
in other ways, it actually strengthened these groups.  Like kites with their strings cut, 
these groups no longer had to answer to the Pakistani military and we able to adapt 
their tactics to better suit their own interests, as opposed to the interests of the 
Pakistani state.    
Nevertheless, Pakistan did retain less formal ties to the insurgency while 
building new strategies vis a vis Kashmir.  The 1948 war made it clear that a tribal 
insurgency was not appropriate.  While, the experience of the 1965 war made it clear 
that there was not a will within Kashmir for a more general uprising.  Further, the 
1971 war made it clear that an outright war with India was not winnable.  The new 
nuclear dimension of the dispute from 1974 on only made this clearer:  full-scale war 
with India was not only unwinnable, but very likely unsurvivable.   
Within Jammu and Kashmir, the insurgency lamented the loss of Pakistan as 
an ally, but, “despite being militarily ineffectual, were able to keep the idea of 
liberation from Indian rule alive until more favorable times arrived.”114  In August of 
1965, Kashmiri nationalists under the direction of Maqbool Bhat formed the National 
Liberation Front (NLF), which was patterned after the Algerian Front de Liberation 
Nationale.  “...The NLF was most likely born of the realization amongst Kashmiri 
nationalists that they needed to compete with the official jihad being run by Pakistan’s 
covert services or risk marginalization.”115  However, only a few years later, the NLF 
would be the only game left in town.     
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In the years before the 1971 war, the NLF floundered, unable to gain much 
support from the Pakistani military or intelligence services.  Pakistan was already 
running its own covert campaign within Jammu and Kashmir and the NLF had no 
established relationship with the military or the ISI.  Bhat charged that “generals hate 
the concept of a people’s army because it challenges the monopoly of the generals on 
military resources.”116  In this case, at least, it seems to have been true.  Further, in the 
run up to the 1971 war, Pakistan’s attention was focused over a thousand miles to the 
East; provoking India over Kashmir would have given India cover to instigate outright 
war over East Pakistan, which it would later anyway.   
In January of 1971, the NLF hijacked an Indian airliner and forced a landing 
in Lahore.  The Pakistani government was taken unawares and began negotiating with 
the hijackers to secure the release of the passengers.  Zulfikar ali Bhutto, head of the 
Pakistani Peoples’ Party, happened to be in Lahore at the time and stepped into the 
negotiations, pledging his support to the hijackers, even offering them political 
asylum.  The hostages were released, but the plane was destroyed, perhaps at Bhutto’s 
behest.117  When Yahya Khan, who had succeeded Ayub Khan as Pakistan’s 
president, was forced from power in December of 1971, Bhutto was aptly positioned 
to assume power in a country reeling and bitter from defeat.  While Bhutto largely cut 
ties with the Kashmiri insurgency, and quietly negotiated with Indira Gandhi's 
government behind the scenes, he nevertheless maintained a constant facade of 
Islamist furor, careful to avoid the fate of the previous president.  “Bhutto’s vocal 
support of the Kashmiris’ right of self-determination could not hide the fact that 
Pakistan’s position over any further initiatives in Kashmir was greatly weakened.”118   
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Beginning in 1973 and continuing into 1974, riots within Indian-controlled 
Kashmir, organized in part by the NLF and the Jamaat-e-Islami (Islamist Party), sent 
a message to New Delhi that, while the insurgency had lost an important battle, the 
war was far from over.  These riots were not spontaneous, but rather the result of a 
sophisticated propaganda initiative.  A student at a local college “discovered” a copy 
of an encyclopedia that depicted the angel Gabriel dictating the Koran to the prophet 
Mohammad and the Jamaat-e-Islami used this blasphemy to mobilize protests which 
very quickly became riots as Indian police attempted to disperse the protesters by 
setting lines of fire in semi-controlled burns.  Four people died.   
Kashmiri Islamists had managed to convince the Muslim population of the 
territory that their religion was under attack and India made this attack seem all the 
more real by its harsh reaction to the protests.  During this crisis, the Jamaat-e-Islami 
was set squarely against the Plebiscite Front, a Kashmiri political party led by Sheikh 
Abdullah, a prominent Kashmiri nationalist.  The Jamaat-e-Islami criticized India of 
trying to “Hinduize” Kashmir and set up Islamic schools to counter their belief that 
“many young Kashmiris had begun to lose their Islamic moorings.”119  However, at 
the same time Bhutto was negotiating with Ghandi behind the scenes, Sheikh 
Abdullah was doing the same, in his case, negotiating from an Indian jail where he 
had been, on and off, since 1953, when he was removed as Prime Minister of Kashmir 
for his separatist views.   
Indeed, the rise of Jamaat-e-Islami can, in many ways, be traced to the 
outlawing of Abdullah’s Plebiscite Front prior to the 1971 Kashmiri elections.  This 
created the political space for the far right party to take several seats in the Kashmiri 
parliament and for it to garner the support and legitimacy it needed to begin a 
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propaganda program within Jammu and Kashmir and undertake the construction of its 
network of Islamic schools.  It was in these schools that the Kashmiri insurgency was 
truly preserved, curated by Jamaat-e-Islami.   
The pact between Ghandi and Abdullah set up Abdullah once again as prime 
minister of Jammu and Kashmir.  In exchange, Abdullah pledged that he would no 
longer advocate for independence, effectively eliminating the Plebiscite Front’s 
raison d’etre.  However, Abdullah’s return to power came with a loss of widespread 
legitimacy.  Prior to the 1977 Jammu and Kashmir elections, Ghandi declared martial 
law and assumed emergency powers, outlawing Jamaat-e-Islami and dismantling its 
network of schools.  However, “Jammu and Kashmir’s Islamists proved adept at 
evading the law.”120  Most of Jamaat-e-Islami’s schools simply re-branded 
themselves, many of them actually offering a better education than some state-run 
schools, which attracted even more middle class children into their ranks.   
In 1977, Gandhi relinquished emergency powers, called for elections, and lost.  
New elections were also called in Jammu and Kashmir.  Sheikh Abdullah’s National 
Conference, which consisted of many members of the old Plebiscite Front, managed 
to take power with over forty percent of the popular vote.  Jamaat-e-Islami took only a 
tenth of that.  This loss, however, simply forced the Islamists outside the realm of 
politics and led directly to the birth of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, 
which was an evolution of the aforementioned National Liberation Front. 
 After the arrest of Maqbool Bhat in a failed bank robbery, the NLF was 
crippled on both sides of the line of control.  In 1977, an alliance between Jamaat-e-
Islami and more radical members of Abdullah’s Plebiscite Front infused the NLF with 
new energy, re-branding it into the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF).  
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The JKLF grew considerably over the next few years, as did the strength of Islamists 
in general, both in India and Pakistan, and around the world.  The 1979 Islamist 
revolution in Iran as well as the soviet invasion of Afghanistan later that same year 
added fuel to the fire.  Islamists in Kashmir were convinced that if they could topple a 
pro-Western government in Iran and take on a super power in Afghanistan, then they 
could fight India too.121  During this time, Jamaat-e-Islami expanded its organization 
of schools under the direction of the Islamic Students Union or Islami Jamiat-e-
Tulaba (IJT), the party’s youth wing.   
 Sheikh Abdullah challenged the growing influence of the Islamist movement 
in any way he could, banning many activities of the Jamaat-e-Islami.  Abdullah 
wished to construct a Kashmiri national identity that had the legitimacy of Islam as a 
core tenant, but that went beyond it.  “Inevitably, Sheikh Abdullah’s ‘obsession with 
empowering the majority community, the [ethnic] Kashmiris, at the cost of the 
minorities [of Jammu and Kashmir]...led to growing discontentment.’”122  Indeed, 
Jamaat-e-Islami challenged the legitimacy of both Abdullah and the National 
Conference at every turn and, perhaps not surprisingly, India did nothing to stop the 
efforts of the Islamists, “not even denying visas to the Jamaat-e-Islami’s foreign 
guests.”123  Indira Gandhi, who had regained power in the 1980 general election, gave 
the Islamists her tacit approval, using them to keep Abdullah in check, believing he 
was the real threat within Kashmir.  Perhaps, in this respect, she had learned (or failed 
to learn) a thing or two from Pakistan’s government.   
 In 1977, Zulfikar ali Bhutto was removed from power, arrested on orders of 
General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq who would assume the presidency later that year.  
Bhutto was accused of rigging the national elections and was hanged for his crime.  
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Bhutto had walked a fine line with Pakistani Islamists.  He had offered them lip 
service at every opportunity, but had done nothing to meet their actual demands.  The 
1977 coup was the direct result of Islamist uprisings which took place after the 
elections.  Bhutto ordered the army to put down the Islamists, but the army “refused 
orders to fire on civilian demonstrators.  Martial law was soon declared and the 
Pakistani Army took de facto control of Pakistan.”124   
The polity, which had only five years earlier been overwhelmingly in support 
of populism and socialist idealism, had once again exposed itself to 
manipulation by Islamic symbols.  The return of Islam to the center stage was 
now complete.  The fact that all this happened under the aegis of Pakistan’s 
most popular government to date, one which had a strong ideological basis of 
its own, only attested to the incomparable influence of Islam on the life and 
thought of Pakistanis.  The seemingly implausible resurgence of Islam in lieu 
of socialism during the Bhutto era meant total victory for Islam and 
confirmed its central role in Pakistani politics.  As populism lost its 
momentum to Islam, the fate of Bhutto’s government was sealed long before 
Islam actually pulled down the People’s Party and its populist government.125 
 
 General Zia-ul-Haq embraced Islam wholeheartedly, incorporating religious 
teaching into even Pakistani military doctrine.  State-supported terrorism was given 
religious sanction.  Further, Zia-ul-Haq pushed enthusiastically for a robust nuclear 
weapons program, creating a shield for a renewed jihad against India.   
In the early 1980s, two deaths would shape the contours of both politics and 
political violence within Kashmir for years to come.  The first was of Sheik Abdullah 
in 1982 which created the political space for Jamaat-e-Islami to co-exist with 
Abdullah’s nationalist party, the National Conference.  The second death was that of 
Maqbool Bhat, who was executed by India in 1984 in response to the kidnapping and 
murder of an Indian diplomat by Kashmiri nationalists in the United Kingdom.  Bhat 
was no Islamist.  “Nations survive,” Bhat had said in a letter from prison, 
“because...of that abiding passion for liberty, which...emboldens one to recite the call 
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for truth before a tyrant...”126  In other letters, he drew on examples from other 
religions and other traditions to illustrate the ethics of his insurgency:  “did Aristotle 
not have to drink poison?  Did Jesus not have to kiss the cross...?  Did Gautam 
Buddha ever compromise...?  Did Martin Luther King, or Marx and Engels...ever 
compromise?.”127  However, the Islamists seized on Bhat’s death to fuel their growing 
movement, claiming Bhat as a martyr to the Islamist cause.  So, in death, Bhat was 
able to unite the nationalists and the Islamists of Kashmir under a single banner, a 
goal he would never have shared in life.   
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which began on Christmas Eve, 1979, 
transformed the Pakistani jihad in Jammu and Kashmir in many ways.  “A war that 
would have consequences of then unimagined magnitude had begun.  In the years to 
come, the jihad in Afghanistan would set off a whirlwind that would turn that country 
into a wasteland, transfigure Pakistan, bring down the Soviet Union, and turn the 
Islamists...against their one-time masters.”128  The Soviet invasion brought a new 
influx of U.S. military aid to Pakistan, which served to prop up Zia-ul-Haq’s military 
regime, and also compelled the United States to look the other way over Pakistan’s 
growing nuclear program and to provide weapons such as F-16 fighter jets that would 
have no use in Afghanistan, but would serve well in any future war against India.  
Further, money not only flowed from the United States, but from many wealthy Gulf 
emirates and Saudi Arabia, which, like Pakistan, hoped to channel their own internal 
Islamist movements against an external enemy.  And all of this money was funneled 
through the ISI.  The Afghan jihad also served to legitimize the spread of global and 
regional Islamist movements, not only in Pakistan, but to some degree, in the West as 
well.   
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The Afghan jihad taught Pakistan some important lessons which it would soon 
apply to the jihad in Kashmir.  First, Pakistan learned that, with sufficient support, an 
insurgency could bleed a more powerful state to death.  With some tweaking the 
strategy that Pakistan employed in the run up to the 1965 war might still work.  
Indeed, India’s own 1971 campaign in East Pakistan that led to Bangladeshi 
independence proved the same point.  Second, the Afghan campaign proved to 
Pakistan that a proxy-war could be “calibrated to a point where it was not worth the 
while of an adversary to punish the sponsor-state.”129  “The water in Afghanistan,” 
Zia-ul-Haq maintained, “must boil at the right temperature.”130  What temperature, 
then, would be appropriate for the conflict in Kashmir?  This is a question to which 
Pakistan’s military would soon apply itself. 
In the early 1980s, a Sikh separatist movement began to take root in the Indian 
state of Punjab.  These conservative nationalists called for the creation of Khalistan, 
an independent, theocratic state where Sikhs would be the majority.  Indira Gandhi 
took a hard line against the Sikhs and what had begun as a political movement soon 
succumbed to its more militant urges.   
In many ways, India’s experience with Sikh extremism parallels Pakistan’s 
with Islamic extremism.  Indeed, Prime Minister Gandhi could have learned much 
from Bhutto’s precarious position prior to the 1977 coup that led to his death.  Gandhi 
used Sikh fundamentalists to undermine her political opponents.  In order to challenge 
the center-right Sikh party Shiromani Akali Dal, Gandhi turned to a far-right preacher, 
Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, who actively campaigned for her in 1980, but declared 
his independence from her only months later.  After the elections, the Akali Dal 
ceased to act within the political system, launching a sustained campaign of low-
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intensity violence against the Indian state.  As the political situation further 
deteriorated, Bhindranwale himself embraced militancy; “as with Bhutto and the 
Islamists, the fundamentalist tiger nurtured by Indira Gandhi soon grew large enough 
to break the chains that contained him.”131  Bhindranwale was the primary organizer 
of a terror campaign in the Summer of 1984, which he ran out of the Golden Temple, 
a revered Sikh holy site he had turned into a makeshift fortress.132   
From at least 1981 the ISI was supplying Sikh terrorists with small arms.133  It 
appears, however, that Zia-ul-Haq was too cautious to go much further until at least 
1983.  From that year onwards, Pakistan not only supplied Sikh insurgents with arms, 
but with training and significant financial support as well.134  Pakistan, for instance, 
was crucial to smuggling funds procured from an affluent Sikh diaspora into 
Punjab.135  The ISI’s operations in Punjab through Sikh proxies were also in large part 
funded through the narcotics trade; “Pakistanis were apt to see narcotics as a 
resource...comparing it to the oil of the Middle East.”136   
In June of 1984, Indira Gandhi ordered the Indian army to seize the Golden 
Temple.  This would radicalize many more Sikhs and add significant numbers to 
Pakistan’s covert cadre of operatives, making Pakistan as significant a player in the 
Indian state of Punjab as it was in Jammu and Kashmir.  Around a thousand people 
were killed in the army’s three day siege of the temple, insurgents and civilians 
alike.137  Four months later Indira Gandhi was dead, assassinated by her Sikh body 
guards in retaliation for the actions she ordered at the Golden Temple.  Soon after, in 
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the worst wave of sectarian violence since partition, countless Sikhs were killed 
across India; almost 3,000 died in the capitol of New Delhi alone.138    
Pakistan, however, was not the only one fomenting cross-border violence in 
the early 1980s.  India was also supporting a nascent separatist movement in the 
Pakistani province of Sindh.  In 1983, a Sindh opposition movement advocating the 
restoration of democracy launched a campaign of violent protests against Zia-ul-
Haq’s regime.  “This agitation took on a sharp regionalist tone, with Sindhis 
demanding greater provincial autonomy, reduced disparities in economic 
development, a more equitable distribution of federal government funds, and 
increased representation in the military and civil services.”139  In many ways, this 
movement was reminiscent of the Bengali movement in its earliest stages, which is 
perhaps why Zia-ul-Haq responded with such overwhelming force, deploying two 
army divisions and helicopter gunships to crush the movement before it could really 
take root.   
The stark rise in non-state violence during the late 1970s and early 1980s is 
not associated with an appreciable rise in inter-state violence during the same period.  
However, there was a major crisis between the two states in the Fall of 1984.  
Pakistan’s growing nuclear program, which the United States was forced to overlook 
in return for Pakistan’s continued support against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, 
alarmed India greatly.  There is significant evidence that Indira Gandhi considered a 
preemptive strike against Pakistan’s nuclear facilities, along the lines of “the Israeli 
model,” referencing Israel’s 1981 attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak.140  
However, a clean attack in the Indo-Pakistani context, she knew, was not possible; 
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any attack against Pakistani nuclear facilities would lead to a wider war.  Clearly, 
India had no qualms about escalation prior to this crisis, so fears of escalation don’t 
seem to fully explain why India chose not to strike in 1984.  Neither does super-power 
balancing; while bi-polarity was indeed waning in the region, India still had a firm 
pledge of mutual defense from the Soviet Union.  Further, the United States had not 
come to Pakistan’s aid in the 1965 war and had made only tentative gestures of doing 
so in 1971, so India had no reason to believe the United States would do so this time.  
Rather, there seems to have been a distinctly nuclear dimension to India’s 
calculations.  Certainly, India did not fear Pakistani nuclear reprisals; by 1984 
Pakistan had not yet achieved the capability to build a bomb, let alone on the short 
notice it would take to use it against Indian aggression.  Rather, Ganguly and Hagerty 
suggest the notion of “boosted conventional deterrence.” “It is not pure nuclear 
deterrence, because no actual nuclear weapons have been deployed by the states 
involved; but it is not pure conventional deterrence either because the deterrent effect 
derives not from a balance of conventional forces, but from the prospect that 
conventional assets can be used to kill far beyond their basic potential when targeted 
against nuclear installations.”141  India’s nuclear facilities were just as exposed as 
Pakistan’s.  And what’s more, India utilized the far more radioactive isotope, 
Plutonium, while Pakistan used primarily Uranium.  India’s nuclear facilities were 
also much closer to large population centers than Pakistan’s.  For India to attack 
Pakistan or its nuclear facilities would be to risk the loss of an expensive, decades’ 
long nuclear program of its own, as well as civilian casualties possibly numbering in 
the millions.   
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It is very likely as well that this calculation played into India’s decision not to 
punish Pakistan for its support of Sikh insurgents in Punjab, something it had been all 
too willing to do in previous wars, despite risks of escalation.  The lack of large-scale 
war during this period and the corresponding rise in non-state violence on the parts of 
both India and Pakistan seem to be rooted in the proto-nuclear politics of the early 
1980s.  In detonating its first nuclear explosive in the previous decade, India had 
created a credible deterrent vis a vis Pakistan, but the same nuclear facilities that 
made the construction of that device possible also gave Pakistan a boosted 
conventional deterrence vis a vis India.  It is unlikely, however, that the Pakistani 
government would have been able to capitalize on it had Washington and wealthy 
Arab emirates not re-infused the state with new sources of  money and ideology.  The 
fledgling nuclear programs of both counties created political space for non-state 
actors to seize the initiative, leading to the first true terror campaigns in the sub-
continent.   
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Case 3: 1986-2007 
 
 Pakistan’s nuclear program was started not long after India’s, growing out of 
that country’s close relationship with the United States and its participation in Dwight 
Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” initiative.  Eisenhower’s December 1953 speech 
was widely reported in the Pakistani media and, inspired by the United States, 
Pakistan began a rapid modernization program directed at all sectors of society.142  In 
1955, a traveling exhibition on the Atoms for Peace program, put together by the U.S. 
Information Agency, opened in Bahawalpur.  It later moved to Karachi, Lahore, and 
Peshawar, touring the country and drawing enthusiastic crowds at each stop.  Thanks 
to the speech and the exhibition, “the atom was now firmly part of the public 
consciousness of a significant number of urban, middle-class Pakistanis.”143  
Successive Pakistani administrations, when attempting to construct and re-construct a 
coherent national identity, stressed the country’s inexorable commitment to science, 
technology, and economic modernization.  Of course, the yardstick by which Pakistan 
measured itself in each of these areas was India.  As India pulled further and further 
ahead in these areas, Pakistan became more and more committed to the simple binary 
variable of nuclear power, and by extension, nuclear weapons.  “If India builds the 
bomb,” Zulfikar ali Bhutto once said, “we will eat grass or leaves; even go hungry, 
but we will get one of our own.”144  Pakistan needed a nuclear weapon not only to 
deter India aggression, but as a matter of national pride.  However, the Pakistani 
nuclear program sewed seeds of conflict in Pakistani society.   
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The embrace of an atomic future essentially distinguished those who saw a 
way for the country to become modern at home and part of the modern world 
from those who were rooted in the past and locality, clung to tradition, and 
did not believe in rapid social change.  In this respect, the idea and ideal of an 
atomic future may be read as representing both the future and the universal as 
opposed to the local and the present.  Based on this radical vision of a future 
world, these new bureaucracies of economy, violence, and technology, 
exposed at a formative stage to American goods, skills, and ways of doing 
things, imbued with certain American tastes and desires, and all privileging 
‘technical superiority,’ set about creating the necessary conditions for the 
exercise of their power.145 
 
 Pakistani elites, chiefly the military, began, in effect, constructing a nuclear 
nationalism to justify their new nuclear state.  By framing nuclear technology in terms 
of Muslim Pakistan versus Hindu India, Pakistani elites were able to capture the 
minds of many conservative Islamists.  When Pakistan detonated its first nuclear 
weapons more than four decades after it first started down the road to nuclear 
weapons capability, it framed this weapon as a Muslim bomb for precisely this 
reason.   
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program (in addition to the nuclear weapons 
programs of at least five other countries) can be traced back to one man, A.Q. Kahn.  
Kahn, a Pakistani expatriate, was working in the Netherlands with gas centrifuges 
designed to produce low-enriched uranium for nuclear reactors, but which were also 
capable of producing highly enriched, weapons-grade uranium.146  Pakistan’s native 
nuclear weapons program was faltering and desperately in need of the help that Kahn 
was in place to offer.  Over ten years Kahn had studied the gas centrifuges in minute 
detail until he was sure that he could re-create them on his own.  When India 
detonated its bomb in 1974, Kahn was alarmed; memories of Pakistan’s defeat at the 
hands India and the loss of its eastern territory just three years earlier were fresh in his 
mind.  Indeed, they were also fresh in the mind of the Pakistani prime minister, 
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Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.  When Kahn sent Bhutto an impassioned letter offering his aid, 
Bhutto was eager to accept it.147 
 This account, largely Kahn’s own, may be conflated to one degree or another, 
but the details are unimportant.  By 1976, Dutch intelligence was onto Kahn, and his 
access to classified material at Ultra-Centrifuge Nederland (UCN), the company for 
which he worked, a member of the Anglo-Dutch-German Uranium Enrichment 
Consortium (URENCO), was restricted.  And yet, the Dutch intelligence services did 
not move to arrest Kahn; they even failed to notify their British and German partners 
in URENCO, as they were required to do under treaty obligation.148  Soon, Khan 
inferred that he was under observation and a month later he left the country on an 
indefinite “vacation.”   
 Upon returning to Pakistan, Kahn maneuvered to take control of Pakistan’s 
weapons program, and with the support of Prime Minister Bhutto did just that.  
Kahn’s direction of the program was aggressive; his pursuit of both the knowledge 
and materiel necessary for the construction of a bomb was critical to the success of 
the program in the long run.  However, it took the aid of China and the better part of a 
decade before Pakistan finally had a workable prototype weapon.  This design was 
“cold” tested, that is tested without the fissionable core, in March of 1983.149  
Certainly a Pakistani nuclear capability began to figure into Indian defense policy 
around this time.  Indira Gandhi first had the Indian military draw up plans for a 
preemptive strike against Pakistani nuclear facilities in 1981.  However, at no time 
prior to 1985 did the Indian military believe that Pakistan had the capability to build a 
bomb in short order.150  By 1986, Pakistan had produced enough fissile material at 
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sufficiently high enrichment to produce a bomb.151  This also seems to be the year 
India began to believe as much.152  So, for these reasons, the truly nuclear period in 
the Indo-Pakistani conflict began in 1986.  After this year, while neither country 
believed that the other had constructed an actual weapon, neither could be sure, and 
both knew that the other had the capability to build one in short order, a matter of 
weeks at most, and certainly quick enough to be decisive in a prolonged conflict.   
 And this period began with yet another crisis.  By 1986, violence in Punjab 
had reached levels intolerable to India; Pakistan’s belief that its nuclear shield would 
forestall any Indian response to its covert war was about to be tested.  Indira Gandhi’s 
son and political successor, Rajiv Gandhi, gave Lieutenant-General K. Sundarji the 
go-ahead to plan and execute a military exercise to signal to Pakistan India’s ability to 
wage a full-scale war against Pakistan.  Operation Brasstacks was a dramatic exercise 
in compellance.  It was also a dramatic failure.  Indeed, one of the enduring legacies 
of Brasstacks is the insight it gives into the Indian politico-military bureaucracy.  “A 
naive, inexperienced prime minister easily allowed an ambitious general to pursue 
a...strategy fraught with considerable risk.”153   
 By December of 1986, India had deployed thirteen divisions, including the 
First Armored Division and the 37th Infantry Division, a total of more than 160,000 
troops, to the Pakistani border.154  Military exercises had been used to mask an 
offensive in the 1973 Yom Kippur war, a fact of which Pakistan’s military leadership 
was well aware.  So, Pakistan responded by mobilizing its own forces along the 
Indian border.  President Zia-ul-Haq authorized his minister of foreign affairs to 
convey a message to the Indian government:   
                                                          
151 Joseph Cirincione, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington:  
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), 210-11. 
152 Devin Hagerty,  Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation (Boston:  MIT Press, 1998), 85. 
153 Op. cit., Ganguly and Hagerty 2005, 77. 
154 Op. cit., Swami 2007, 151. 
65 
 
If India took any action not conducive to its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, then Pakistan was ‘capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on 
it.’  Pakistan’s action would not be limited to northern India alone but also 
to facilities outside the north.  When asked whether this implied an attack 
on Bombay [now Mumbai], the Pakistani Minister replied that ‘it might be 
so.’155 
 
 Although there is some evidence that General Sundarji may have wanted to 
provoke an outright war with Pakistan, when it became clear that Pakistan could not 
be intimidated, the crisis quickly deescalated.156  “Put simply, India had threatened to 
respond to sub-conventional war with conventional means--and Pakistan had called its 
bluff.”157  To Zia-ul-Haq, support of the insurgents in Punjab seemed to have been a 
“low cost, low risk, high return” investment.158  This example shows that nuclear 
weapons played a fundamentally different role in South Asia than they played in the 
Cold War.   
Nuclear weapons were used to compensate for the perceived conventional 
inferiority of NATO, but the U.S. was not interested in using military force to 
upset the status quo in Europe.  In South Asia, however, nuclear weapons 
have helped Pakistan compensate for the conventional superiority of India, 
and Pakistan has been interested in using military force to upset the status 
quo.159   
 
 Of perhaps more interest that the exercise itself is India’s response to its 
failure to compel Pakistan to desist from its covert war in Punjab.  After Brasstacks, 
India set up an offensive program within the RAW, which carried out a series of 
reprisal bombings inside Pakistan, demonstrating “India’s ability to meet terrorism 
with terrorism.”160  Indian attacks within Pakistan continued well into the 1990s and 
met with some success, helping to limit Pakistan’s support for insurgents in Punjab.   
 Over the next few years, the political conditions of Jammu and Kashmir 
deteriorated rapidly.  Farooq Abdullah enjoyed enormous success as chief minister in 
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the first months after his father’s death.  However, he was soon undermined by New 
Delhi, which had grown wary of his success.  In a coup sponsored by Indira Gandhi, 
Abdullah was removed from office, which paved the way for the Islamists to make 
their resurgence into politics.  Prior to the 1987 elections, Islamist opposition 
coalesced around the Muslim United Front (MUF), which included the Jamaat-e-
Islami and a handful of other Islamist parties under its banner.  Once again, it seems, 
the Indian government had snatched defeat from the jaws of victory, undermining the 
very peace and stability it seemed to espouse in Jammu and Kashmir for fear 
Kashmiri nationalists would enjoy too much electoral success.  The MUF enjoyed 
some electoral success, but fell short of a majority in the assembly.  This failure 
demonstrated that democracy was viable if the Islamists ever wished to take control of 
Jammu and Kashmir.  “Flush with military resources diverted from the Afghan jihad, 
and having tested Indian responses in Punjab, Pakistan’s covert services were ready to 
initiate a third front in Jammu and Kashmir.”161  What followed was an “attempted 
putsch:  a bid by a defeated social class to seize power after their attempt to acquire it 
through the formal processes of democracy had been thwarted.”162   
 In 1987, the JKLF and Jamaat-e-Islami renewed their offensive in Jammu and 
Kashmir, this time with Pakistan’s full and military and financial support.  
Widespread violence from 1987 onward racked Jammu and Kashmir.  Mass protests 
resulted in confrontations with Indian police that left many dead, insurgents and 
civilians alike.  Only a harsh crackdown by the Indian military staved off an outright 
coup on the part of the Islamists, a coup that “Indian authorities believed...had been 
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brewing ever since 1987... [when] a declaration of independence would be made in 
Srinagar, and the flag of Islam hoisted in place of the Indian national flag.”163   
 Nonetheless, the political violence continued.  There were countless rapes and 
killings; liquor, beauty parlors, and cinemas were banned; and acid was thrown on 
women who refused the hijab.164 
With the wisdom of hindsight, 1990 marked the end of a phase of the jihad 
in Jammu and Kashmir, the very year it exploded on the world’s 
consciousness.  From this point on, the jihad would be given substance not 
by the anti-India forced which had grouped together in the MUF, but by the 
ISI and the jihadist groups it sponsored.165 
 
The year 1990 would also bring with it another interstate crisis and the first 
phase of a truly nuclear jihad.  It was, indeed, a nuclear jihad because without 
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal as a shield against a conventional India reprisal, it would 
have been impossible to wage for long.  By 1990, Kashmir had descended into 
anarchy; insurgents were in open rebellion, attacking rail lines, communications hubs, 
and other key military infrastructure.  India believed that these attacks might be 
prelude to a Pakistani offensive, and so deployed the Indian Army along the border.  
At the same time, Kashmir’s local democracy was suspended, and the territory was 
placed under martial law.  In January, Indian police, attempting to break up a mass 
demonstration, sprayed a crowd of civilians with machine gun fire, killing thirty-two 
people.166  This massacre would serve to catalyze resistance in Jammu and Kashmir, 
not only during the 1990 crisis, but for years to come.167   
In march, Benazir Bhutto, who had been elected Prime Minister of Pakistan 
after the restoration of democracy two years earlier, traveled to Kashmir and promised 
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“‘a thousand year war’ in support of the militants.”168   India was certainly listening.  
India put more military resources into Jammu and Kashmir and mobilized several 
divisions along the Pakistani border “in such a way to ‘halve India’s response 
time...’”169  One prominent India politician warned that “Pakistan would ‘cease to 
exist’ if it attacked India.170  There seems to have been an overt nuclear dimension to 
such signaling.   
By mid-April 1990, the disposition of military forces near the Indo-
Pakistani border and the LoC in Kashmir was as follows.  In Kashmir, India 
had deployed up to 200,000 troops, drawn from both the Indian Army and 
paramilitary soldiers.  Pakistan had deployed a smaller force of at least 
100,000 soldiers in the part of Kashmir under its control.  the Indian and 
Pakistani forces were reported to be ‘eyeball to eyeball’ across the LoC, in 
some cases as close as 20 meters apart.  Demonstrating the heightened 
tension in the disputed territory, the UN Military Observer Group in Indian 
and Pakistan reported a quadrupling of LoC violations...as compared to the 
same period in 1989.171 
 
 By April, the United States was certainly concerned with escalation; in May, 
then Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates paid a visit to the region.  Gates 
impressed upon Pakistan’s leadership that it could not hope to win a war with India 
and it could expect no help from the United States should things get out of hand.  
Further, Gates admonished Pakistan for its support of terror in Kashmir and Punjab.  
Since the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, the U.S.-Pakistani 
relationship had become increasingly more strained.  Gates also warned India that war 
would be costly and that any victory would by Pyrrhic.  As well, he impressed upon 
India Pakistan’s growing nuclear capabilities and the danger that any war with 
Pakistan “‘might go nuclear.’”172   
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 In effect, both nations were already de facto nuclear weapons states; the 
United States simply helped to construct a deterrence framework between the two 
countries.  Only a few weeks after Gates’s mission, India pulled back its armored 
divisions from the border, and Pakistan followed suit soon thereafter.  In 1965, 
Pakistan had sent infiltrators across the cease-fire line and India had responded with 
conventional forces, escalating the conflict to full-scale war.  In 1990, the situation 
was much the same, but as with the 1986 crisis, India had failed to respond 
conventionally; and neither had it breached the Line of Control.  The key difference 
between the two cases is nuclear weapons.   
 In 1998, both India and Pakistan transitioned from de facto to de jure nuclear 
weapons states.  In May of that year, India tested a series of five nuclear devices in its 
northern desert state of Rajasthan.  Only seventeen days later, Pakistan began its own 
series of six nuclear tests, one to match each of India’s, including India’s first test in 
1974.   
 India faced extraordinary pressure, both internal and external, during the 
1990s to demonstrate its military capabilities.  The fall of the Soviet Union had left 
India without the comfort of a superpower patron, and China was quickly achieving 
great power status, both in economic and military terms.  Just as Pakistan has always 
measured itself in comparison to India, India has done the same with China.  The 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970 legitimized China’s nuclear weapons status 
and a year later China became a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council.  To 
India, this was not a coincidence.  In 1971, the U.S. warned India against pursuing 
further aggression against Pakistan by sailing an aircraft carrier into the Bay of 
Bengal.  Shortly after these events, India tested its first nuclear device.  Though India 
claimed that this was a “peaceful device,” its political effect was the same as a 
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weapon and clear enough; “the fact remained that if such a peaceful device were to be 
dropped on Islamabad, the city would be no more.”173  In 1998, India’s coalition 
government promised a return to Indian greatness.  These nuclear tests were an 
example of Indian “swagger” in that they were meant to demonstrate to the world that 
India was a de jure nuclear weapons state, regardless of the NPT.  They also 
demonstrated to China that India possessed a credible nuclear deterrent, and there 
may have been some limited amount of compellence intended vis a vis Pakistan.   
 Pakistan’s nuclear tests were also largely swagger as well.  That Pakistan’s 
tests came so close on India’s heels and matched India’s tests tit for tat point to this 
fact.  In addition, both states exaggerated the yields of their respective tests to make 
them seem more impressive to each other.  Pakistan also wanted to declare its de jure 
status and to signal to India that its nuclear deterrent was credible.  Pakistan also faced 
significant internal pressures.  “As a weak prime minister...[Nawaz Sharif was] faced 
with a tidal wave of nationalistic sentiment from every quarter of Pakistani 
society.”174  Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto challenged the current prime 
minister’s manhood “by throwing down her bangles (bracelets), ‘suggesting that if he 
did not authorize a test promptly he was the woman and should wear the bangles.’175  
Then, there is the real possibility that Pakistan’s failure to respond in kind could have 
been taken by India to mean that its nuclear posturing had been a bluff all along.   
 The United States did attempt to pressure Pakistan not to engage in any 
nuclear tests, but failed for some key reasons.  President Clinton offered Pakistan “a 
huge conventional arms package” and a significant reduction in Pakistan’s foreign 
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debt obligations.176  However, there was “intense resentment among Pakistan’s 
strategic elites for having been ‘abandoned’ by Washington after the Soviets left 
Afghanistan...” and stiff economic sanctions, which the United States imposed in the 
early 1990s (after Washington no longer needed Islamabad’s help) left the United 
States with little leverage.177  The promise of future aid, which can easily be revoked 
by an unwilling Congress or a future administration, is never as compelling as the 
threat of taking away aid already in place.  This is important enough to say again 
because it can be directly applied to the current crisis over Iran’s nuclear program:  
economic sanctions were not effective in dissuading either India or Pakistan from 
pursuing and testing nuclear weapons, and in Pakistan’s case actually served to inhibit 
any leverage the United States may have had.   
 Almost exactly one year after the 1998 nuclear tests Pakistan initiated another 
covert infiltration of Indian-controlled Kashmir.  One of the key goals of this 
incursion was to disrupt supply lines to an Indian garrison on the disputed Siachen 
glacier.  Further, Pakistan was losing influence inside Jammu and Kashmir and 
wished to regain the initiative.  An “unwavering and increasingly calibrated” 
application of force by India’s security forces had succeeded in pushing back Islamist 
insurgents without significant civilian casualties.178  Further, local support for foreign 
fighters, mehamaan mujahideen (literally, guest insurgents) was beginning to wane as 
these insurgents’ attacks increasingly led to unacceptable civilian deaths.  By the mid-
1990s, the JKLF had forsworn the use of violence and recommitted itself to the 
political process.  At the same time, Farooq Abdullah reentered politics, winning back 
his old position as chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir.  At the same time as 
political conditions were improving within Kashmir, the bi-lateral relationship 
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between Islamabad and New Delhi also seemed to be warming.  Prime Minister Atal 
Behari Vajpayee of India paid an historic visit to Lahore in February of 1999, 
ostensibly “to inaugurate a new bus service linking it [Lahore] to the Indian city of 
Amritsar.”179  However, the visit had a symbolic depth well beyond this.  “It was 
significant...because Vajpayee, the leader of a hyper-nationalistic party, chose to 
initiate this attempt at reconciliation....also...because during the visit he paid his 
respects at...a monument that commemorates...the creation of the Pakistani state.”180  
Vajpayee and Sharif soon thereafter signed the Lahore declaration which “called for a 
series of nuclear-related confidence-building measures and reaffirmed the two sides’ 
wish to resolve the Kashmir dispute through peaceful means.”181  However, Prime 
Minister Sharif was not fully in control of Pakistan, especially when it came to 
defense policy.  The military had always kept a watchful eye on Pakistan’s domestic 
politics and it is extremely likely that the Pakistani Army wished to undermine the 
peace process and efforts to normalize relations with India.  Indeed, the head of 
Pakistan’s military, General Pervez Musharraf, would force Sharif from power in a 
bloodless coup only a few months later.   
 What started as a relatively minor incursion quickly escalated as India proved 
unable to dislodge the infiltrators.  India resorted to the use of its air power for the 
first time since the 1971 war.  Indian casualties were heavy, but nonetheless, India 
soon gained the upper hand.  By mid-July, Pakistan had begun to withdraw forces, 
“keen on maintaining the fictive position that the mujahideen had scaled these heights 
and seized the redoubts of their own accord.”182   
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 Fear of nuclear escalation, however, kept Indian forces firmly on their side of 
the line of control.  It is undeniable that without nuclear weapons Pakistan could 
never have engaged in such a limited probe of Indian defenses with any certainty that 
India would not escalate the conflict out of hand.  By forestalling a return to normalcy 
in Kashmir, Pakistan managed to retain some degree of influence vis a vis the 
insurgency; this also would not have been possible without Pakistan’s nuclear 
weapons.  Ganguly and Hagerty argue that “the mutual acquisition of nuclear 
weapons could not prevent low-level incursions in peripheral areas.”183  Nuclear 
weapons, will however, ensure peace and stability on a macro level, they argue.  I find 
a crucial flaw in this argument:  by preserving the status quo at the macro level, 
nuclear weapons also inherently destabilize the micro level, especially when 
possessed by states with irredentist claims and highly ideological foreign policy.  It is 
not simply a case of nuclear deterrence being unable to prevent low-intensity conflict; 
in the Indo-Pakistani conflict it has actively encouraged it.   
 In December of 2001, six members of Pakistani terrorist group Lashkar-e-
Taiba, the Army of the Righteous, assaulted the Indian parliament building in New 
Delhi; after a fierce gun battle, all six attackers and eight Indian security personnel lay 
dead.  “Within a day after the attack on the Indian national parliament, Indian officials 
linked the attackers to the Lashkar-e-Taiba.  They also contended that the group acted 
at Pakistan’s behest.”184  By the late 1990s insurgent groups within Jammu and 
Kashmir were beginning to ally with transnational terrorist groups, most notoriously 
al-Qaida, and to focus their attacks further afield; if they could not win in Kashmir 
itself, they would take the fight to New Delhi or Mumbai.185  This tactic increased 
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dramatically after September 11, 2001 and represents a new phase in Pakistan’s 
decades long jihad.   
 In response to the Indian parliament attack and others like it, India undertook 
another significant military mobilization and demanded that Pakistan ban both 
Lashkar-e-Taiba and another group, the Jaish-e-Mohammed (Army of Mohammed); 
in addition, India demanded the extradition of twenty accused terrorists from 
Pakistan; and demanded that Pakistan cease its support to insurgents in Jammu and 
Kashmir.186  Pakistan did none of these things and India, again, backed down.   
 After this last crisis, tensions again eased, thanks in large part to pressure from 
the United States and Pakistan’s desire to stay on the good side of America's “war on 
terror.”  By mid-2002 insurgent activity in Kashmir had abated to levels more in line 
with those before the 1999 Kargil crisis.  In this sense, India’s signaling was 
successful in that the United States was a tertiary audience and was convinced of the 
credibility of India’s threat, even if Pakistan wasn’t.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
 In the first period examined (1948-1973) there were three major inter-state 
wars between India and Pakistan.  Of a total 220,317 estimated battle deaths during 
this period, 166,223 (75 percent) are directly attributable to interstate conflict.187  Of 
particular interest during this period is the willingness of both states to escalate the 
conflict when it served their ends.  For example, in 1965, India crossed the 
international border, taking the fight into Pakistan instead of simply fighting Pakistani 
infiltrators on their own ground.  The scope of India’s 1971 war was even broader and 
certainly posed an existential threat to the Pakistani state; indeed, Pakistan lost half of 
its territory in this war.   
 For most of the second period (1974-1985), Pakistan appeared defeated and 
demoralized.  During this period violence fell remarkably.  Further, of 30,926 total 
battle deaths, only 172 are directly attributable to interstate conflict, just over half a 
percent.188  After 1971, insurgents in Kashmir were largely on their own.  More than 
anything, the influx of foreign fighters and U.S. and Saudi money towards the end of 
this period is responsible for turning this trend around.  It is unlikely that India’s 
nuclear weapon had much to do with Pakistan’s reluctance to engage in violence; 
rather these effects were largely over-determined by Indian conventional superiority 
during this period.  However, it is very unlikely that Pakistan would have been able to 
recover and re-engage with not only the insurgency in Kashmir, but one in Punjab as 
well, had it not been edging towards nuclear weapons status in the early to mid-1980s.   
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 During the third period of the Indo-Pakistani conflict (1986-2007) violence 
once again skyrocketed.  It is during this final period that nuclear weapons made their 
greatest impact on the conflict.  Pakistan, while still reluctant to engage in a 
conventional conflict with India, redoubled its efforts to support the insurgency in 
Kashmir and Punjab.  For the first time, India was now equally reluctant to engage in 
a conventional conflict with Pakistan, for fear any such conflict might escalate to the 
nuclear level.  Of 353,926 estimated battle deaths during this period, only 3,015 
(slightly less than 1 percent) were directly attributable to interstate conflict.189   
Most previous work looking at the effects of nuclear weapons on conflict, 
even such work specifically applied to the Indo-Pakistani context, has focused 
primarily on the state level of analysis.  Authors that have examined non-state actors 
have only viewed them as an extension of the state, not as a political force in their 
own right with interests very much separate from the interests of a state.  Ganguly, 
Hagerty, and Waltz, in particular, have treated non-state violence as inseparable from 
other forms of low-intensity conflict, such as limited probes and special operations 
actions.  This is not the case.  Non-state actors in Kashmir and Punjab, while enjoying 
the significant support and direction of the Pakistani state, have never been fully 
under control of the ISI.  Ganguly and Kapur have argued that Pakistan has a 
“sorcerer’s apprentice” problem. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the Pakistani government nurtured terror 
organizations…as tools of asymmetric warfare against the Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan and then against Indian rule…in Kashmir.  The 
jihadis were armed and trained by elements of the Pakistani military and 
intelligence services, and funded by a sophisticated international financial 
network….Now, however…the jihadi organizations, like the magic brooms 
in Goethe’s tale, have taken on a life of their own….Like Goethe’s brooms, 
they often act against the interests of their creators, attacking security 
personnel, assassinating government officials, and seizing large swaths of 
territory within Pakistan, as well as launching attacks on India that could 
trigger a regional conflagration.  (Ganguly and Kapur, p. 91)190 
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 To examine the actions of non-state groups such as the JKLF or Lashkar-e-
Taiba as if they were always the direct will of the Pakistani state is the wrong 
approach.  Rather, these actors exist, or are allowed to exist, precisely because 
Pakistan is incapable of exorcising its will in many ways that other states take for 
granted.    Nuclear weapons only exacerbate this problem.  Pakistan is a state too 
weak to fully monopolize the use of violence within its borders; nuclear weapons 
make this weak state capable of demanding that those borders actually expand.   
 According to Charles Tilly, “war made the state, and the state made war.”191   
Jeffery Herbst has applied this reasoning to Africa, arguing that a lack of interstate 
conflict is one reason that African states are notoriously weak.  States that are unable 
to efficiently extract resources from their populations and that are unable to maintain 
control of all their territory, lose those populations and territory to more efficient rival 
states.  Therefore, through a process of unnatural selection, states become smaller and 
smaller until they are able to control their territory and extract their resources 
efficiently.  A terrific example of this is the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war which led to the 
creation of Bangladesh from former Pakistani territory.  Since independence, 
Bangladesh has enjoyed a remarkably stable democracy and high levels of economic 
development, both of which would have been impossible under Pakistani rule.   
Edward Luttwak has argued that war has, among many other evils, the great 
virtue of being able to resolve political conflict and eventually bring peace.  However, 
“this can [only] happen when all belligerents become exhausted or when one wins 
decisively.”192  It is profoundly ironic that nuclear weapons, in preventing such 
decisive conflict, have prolonged the Indo-Pakistani conflict and led to countless 
civilian deaths.  Some authors have argued that nuclear weapons create macro-level 
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stability, preventing great numbers of civilian casualties.  Sumit Ganguly, Devin 
Hagerty, Paul Kapur, and Kenneth Waltz have made a strong case that nuclear 
weapons have prevented full-scale war between India and Pakistan, admitting, 
however, that nuclear weapons have been unable to prevent smaller-scale conflicts.  
This misses the point.  In the case of India and Pakistan, nuclear weapons have 
actively prolonged conflict, leading to profound regional “bottom-up” instability.  
Nuclear weapons have provided Pakistan with a shield against Indian conventional 
forces, leaving India unable to deal with Pakistani state-sponsored terrorism without 
resorting to the same tactics itself.  By investing in nuclear weapons programs, both 
states have been forced to withhold precious resources from other areas; Pakistan, 
especially, suffers from a weak state and could use those same resources to strengthen 
the central government and improve the lives of its citizens.  The feminist challenge 
to realist notions of security “security for whom and by what means?” seems 
especially apt in this case.193  And further, by funding non-state actors and 
encouraging their use of violence, Pakistan has further undermined the legitimacy of 
its state, both internally and internationally.  Pakistan’s “sorcerer’s apprentice” 
problem is very real; if Islamist groups with no qualms about using violence ever 
gained access to just one of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, millions of innocent civilians 
could pay the price.  A recent piece in the Atlantic suggests that Pakistan is much 
more concerned with keeping its nuclear weapons safe from India and the United 
States than it is with keeping them safe from domestic terrorist groups; Pakistan has 
even carted fully assembled devices around in delivery vans to hide their locations 
from foreign spy agencies.194  If these reports are true, it is a terrifying prospect.  
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Further, the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008 demonstrate that Pakistan is still very 
much in the business of terror.   
Whether these conclusions hold true beyond the sub-continent remains to be 
seen, but I believe it is very likely they will.  Israel has already been accused of 
supporting Iranian dissident groups and helping them to plan and carry out attacks on 
Iranian nuclear scientists.  Should Iran gain access to nuclear weapons, one can easily 
imagine Iranian support of groups like Hezbollah increasing.   
Nuclear weapons are incredibly effective at preventing full-scale war.  
However, there are other ways to do this that are just as effective:  conventional 
deterrence, alliances, shared identity, democratic peace.  The pattern established 
during the Cold War seems to be the exception rather than the rule.  Between 
proximate developing states, especially when one or more of those states has a 
compelling interest in upsetting the status quo, nuclear weapons are a profoundly 
destabilizing influence.  The profound tragedy of nuclear weapons is not that they will 
be used (though that remains a stark possibility) nor that they are irrelevant; the 
tragedy of nuclear weapons is that the very strength of their deterrent effect allows 
states to pursue their ends beyond the constraints of their neighbors and beyond the 
constraints of the international system; nuclear weapons allow weak states to 
consolidate their weakness; and nuclear weapons lead to high levels of non-state 
violence, which disproportionately affects civilians. 
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